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A bs tract  
 
This  A rticle explores the role of  ins urance as  s ubs titute f or 
direct regulation of  ris ks  posed by s evere w eather.  In  pricing 
the ris k of  human activity along the predicted path of 
s torms , ins urance can provide incentives  f or ef f icient 
location decis ions  as  w ell as  f or  cos t - j us tif ied mitigation 
ef f ort  i n building cons truction and inf ras tructure . Currently, 
how ever,  much  ins urance f or s evere w eather ris ks  is  
provided and  heavily  s ubs idized by the government. The 
Article demons trates  tw o primary dis tortions  aris ing f rom 
the government’s  dominance in thes e  ins urance markets. 
First, the s ubs idies  are allocated dif f erentially acros s  
hous eholds , res ulting in a s ignif icant regres s ive 
redis tribution, f avoring af f luent homeow ners  in coas tal 
communities. The Article provides s ome  empirical meas ure s  
of  this  ef f ect. Second, the s ubs idies  induce exces s ive 
development ( and redevelopment )  of  s torm - s tricken and 
eros ion - prone areas.   While political ef f orts  to s cale dow n 
the ins urance s ubs idies  have s o f ar f ailed, by exposing the 
unintended cos ts  of  government - s ubs idized ins urance this  
A rticle contributes  to reevaluation of  the s ocial regulation of  
w eather ris k.  
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H umanity has  f igured out all too w ell how  to change the w eather 
unintentionally. 1  But it is  s till a long w ay f rom learning how  to engineer 
the w eather deliberately. We do not know  how  to s teer damaging s torms  
aw ay f rom populated areas , how  to moderate the torrential rain s  that 
produce damaging  f loods , or how  to end droughts . The technology to 
mitigate s evere w eather , especially large s torms ,  is  s till s cience f iction .2  
What w e can do , how ever,  is w eather the s torm. Using the tools  
of  prediction and rational planning, w e  can regulate human exposure  to 
the r i s k  of  bad w eather.  Using his torical data and predictive models , 
s cientis ts  and policymakers  can anticipate weather patterns and take 
s teps to reduce w eather - related harm s . Our society  may not be able to  
control the w ind, the rain ,  or lightning, but w e  can build s turdier homes  
on higher ground  w ith s tronger  roof s  and  lightning rods . By direct ing  
airplanes and s hips away f rom dangerous  s torms ,  or by build ing  dams  
and  levies , w e  are regulat ing  behavior in the s hadow — under the cloud —
of  dis obedient  w eather patterns.  
T he term “ n atura l dis as ter ” is thus  a mis nomer . A ll weather 
catas trophes are the res ult of  a combination of  natural f orces  and human 
policies. Although  t he natural f orces  component is  uncontrollable, the 
devas tating outcomes  can be mitigated  by appropriate human policies. 
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That w eather - related dis as ters  continue to impose major los s es  is  a res ult 
of  of ten imprudent or s hor t s ighted human choices. 3  
Regulating  w eather ris k is  an increas ingly urgent  s ocial is s ue.  
There is  little doubt that the f requency and magnitude of  w eather - related 
dis as ters  are ris ing  over time. 4  Although the precise combination of  
caus es  may be debated — emis s ions  of  greenhous e gas es ? natural climatic 
cycles ? i ncreas ed concentration of  populations  in coas tal areas ? 5 — the 
trend is  undisputed . Hurricane K atrina in 2005 and H urricane  S andy in 
2012 brought unprecedented property damage to the G ulf  s tates  and to 
the coas tal northeas tern s tate s ; 6  and in 2013 Typhoon Haiyan,  w hich 
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devas tated the P hilippines , eliminating entire villages  and killing 
thous ands , may have been the s tronges t tropical cyclone to hit land in 
recorded his tory. 7  Beyond anecdotes , the trend is  clear: w eather - dis as ter 
los s e s  are ris ing in the U.S . (Figure 1) 8  and w orldw ide (F igure  2).  
As t he magnitude and f requency of  w eather patterns  s eem to pose 
a ris k higher than ever , a large and grow ing f raction of  humanity’s  
physical as s ets  is located in harm’s  w ay. 9  Thus, the combination of  
s evere natural f orces  and increas ed human exposure pose one of  the 
maj or publ ic policy challenges  of  our era: how  to regulate behavior s o as  
to reduce  this  ris k.  
There are many w ays  that s ocieties  can reduce the ris k  of  
increas ingly large and potentially devas tating s torms. One approach is to 
addres s  the root caus e s  of  climate change.  Another approach is to  adopt 
rules and practices  that reduce the harm that unavoidable climatic 
patterns caus e . We ref er to this  latter  approach as the r egulation of 
weather risk . 
R egulation of  w eather ris k can take various  f orms . For example,  
to improve the durability of  cons truction under s evere w eather 
conditions , local governments  can adopt more demanding building codes  
and  s tricter s tandards  of  f loodplains management .  To  reduce exposure to 
w eather - caus ed harm , the government can  beef  up zoning regulations  or 
inves t  in community inf ras tructure , di vert ing  development away f rom 
high - ris k areas  or improv ing  f lood res is tance in developed areas . 
The f ocus  of  this  article is  on a dif f erent f orm of  regulation of  
s evere w eather  ris k : r egulation through ins ur ance . Insurance is  not 
commonly regarded  as a f orm of  command - and - control regulation. 
Rather, it is  w idely  recognized as  the primary tool to provide relief  af ter 
damaging w eather  events , s hif ting los s es  after they occur . But  ins urance 
is  als o an important — and in the w eather context,  a  potentially  crucial —
device in controlling and incentivizing behavior pr ior  to the occur r ence 
of los s es .   
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Buying  ins urance is  more than participating in a ris k - spreading 
pool , waiting f or the lightning to s trike . It is als o a trans action in w hich 
policyholders  are incentivized, in various  direct and indirect w ays  us ing 
contractual tools  that w e identif y , to adopt lo ss mitigation meas ures. 
Deploying their s uperior acces s  to ris k data and prediction methods ,  and 
pressured by competition to keep premiums af f ordable,  ins urers  prompt  
policyholders  to mitigate their exposure to harm. 10  An entire 
community’s  preparedness  f or  s evere w eather is  importantly s haped —
and potentially improved — by  the aggregation of  ins urance contracts  
held by the community’s  members.  
Looking at ins urance providers , private or government al ,  as 
r egulator s  of weather risk , t he  article as ks  tw o s ets  of  ques tions . First, 
h ow  does  w eather ins ura n ce  mitigate the expected cos ts  of  w eather -
related dis as ters ?  S econd,  d oes  the regulatory impact of ins urance 
change in s ys tematic w ays  w hen the government becomes  the provider 
of  w eather ins urance?  
In addres s ing t he f irs t ques tion , w e reconcile tw o  bas ic but  
conf licting ins ights . At one end s tands  the w idely accepted idea  that 
having ins urance dulls  the ins ured party’s incentive to mitigate los s es.  
This idea, commonly ref erred to as  “ moral hazard,” has  been w e l l -
s tudied in the literature on the economics  of  ins urance . T he theory of  
moral hazard s ugges t s  that ,  w hile  ins urance may be us ef ul and ef f icient 
as  a f orm of  post - disas ter relief , it des troys  the incentives  f or  pre - disas ter 
los s  mitigation .  
In opposition to  the moral hazard  conj ecture  s tands  a dif f erent 
prediction — not nearly as  w ell s tudied or w ell  unders tood — that 
ins urance contracts  reduce, rather than aggravate, ris k. Anticipating  that 
s torms  may be  coming  and recognizing that ins ured property owners  
might  capitulate to the  moral hazard,  ins urance providers  include in their 
contracts  powerful counter - incentives . These contractual mechanis ms  
prompt  policyholders  to improve their preparedness  and reduce the 
exposure of  their property to w eather - related los s es , potentially to a 
greater extent than they w ould have done in the abs ence of  ins urance .  
In addres s ing the f irs t ques tion — if  and how  ins urance mitigates  
the cos ts  of  w eather dis as ters — w e f ocus  on s everal  contractual tools  
ins urers  us e to improve policyhol ders ’  incentives , including incentives  to 
build s turdier homes. But our f ocus  is  ultimately on the mos t important 
aspect of w eather preparedness : how  ins urance a f f ect s  people’s  decis ions  
wher e  to  live.   
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10  S e e  O m r i  B e n - S h a h a r  &  K y l e  D. L o g u e ,  O utso u r c i n g  R e g u l atio n :  H o w  
I n s u r a n c e  R e d u c e s  M o r a l  H a z a r d ,  1 1 1  M I C H . L.  R E V . 1 9 7  ( 2 0 1 2 ).  
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Recognizing the w ays  in w hich ins urance can regulate w eather 
ris k, the article turns  to addres s  the s econd f undamental ques tion: w ho 
s hould provide the ins urance  and act as  the regulator of  w eather ris k —
private ins urance companies or the government? While in theory the 
ow ners hip and adminis tration  of  the ins urance mechanis m need not 
af f ect  the  optimal  content and des ign  of  ins urance contracts , w e s how  
that in practice it makes  a great dif f erence.  Unlike private ins urance, 
g overnment provision of  w eather ins urance  is less s ubj ect to market 
dis ciplin e  and to the s trict methods  of  actuarial  pricing, and is more 
likely to be inf luenced by political cons iderations ,  redis tributive 
preferences , and af f ordability  concerns . We identif y the primary f eatures  
of  government - provided  w eather  ins urance  and s how  th at it is priced 
dramatically dif f erently than private ins urance contracts , that it is  
purchased by dif f erent pools of  policyholders , that it create s  a dif f erent 
pattern of  w ithin - pool cros s  s ubs idies , and — mos t importantly — that it is  
responsible f or  dif f erent ex ante  mitigation and preparedness  incentives  
among homeow ners  and community developers . 
Th is  A rticle demons trates  that  regulation of  w eather ris k through  
government provided ins urance in the U.S. is of ten inf erior to regulation 
that might be i mplemented through private ins urance  markets . It is 
inf erior in tw o w ays. First, it is  les s  ef f icient. When people and f irms  are 
i ns ured by the government through contracts  that f ail to produce good 
incentives , they choos e property  locations  too clos e to paths that 
devas tating s torms  normally travel, and are thus  too vulnerable to harm . 
And when their homes  and bus ines s es  are in f act des troyed, they of ten 
rebuild in the s ame place — and in the s ame w ay — largely becaus e 
government ins urers  do not ins is t otherw i s e.  
Government ins urance can be inf erior in another w ay: it is  unf air. 
Almost all ins urance s chemes  create cros s - s ubs idies , w hereby s ome 
participants in the pool are over - charged and thus  s ubs idize others  w ho 
are undercharged. The unf airnes s  w e identif y has  to do w ith the troubling 
direction of  the cros s - s ubs idy that government - provided w eather 
ins urance in the U.S. creates : homeow ners  w ho enj oy the larges t 
ins urance cros s - s ubs id ies are thos e  w ho need them  least.  That is , the 
s ubs idy moves  f rom the poor t o the af f luent , rather than the revers e . The 
government , in other w ords ,  turns  out to be a regres s ive regulator of  
w eather  ris k . Using unique data f rom F lorida’s  s tate ins urance company, 
we es timate the magnitude of  the benef it that w ealthy homeow ners  
enj o y.  
Th is  A rticle is  s tructured as  f ollow s. The f irs t tw o S ections  are 
des criptive. Section I examines  the regulatory tools  that ins urers  have to 
improve the preparedness  of  their policyholders. Section II examines  the 
specific f eatures  of  government - provided ins urance, f ocus ing on three 
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programs th at are relevant to w eather ris k: post - disas ter relief , the 
N ational F lood Ins urance P rogram, and F lorida’s  s tate ow ned Citizens  
Ins urance that s ells  w ind ins urance policies. Section III then presents the 
normative claims  of  the article: G overnment ins uranc e creates  unf air 
pooling of  ris k and leads  to inef f icient preparedness.  
 
I.  REGULATION OF W EATHER RISK B Y  I NSURANCE  
 
Weather ris k — like any ris k — can be mitigated or prevented by 
enacting rules  that change people’s behavior prior to dis as ter . C ommon 
examples are the adoption of  building codes  and the us e of  zoning  
res trictions  at the local level . Building s tandards  reduce the vulnerability  
of  s tructures  to  s torms  and hars h conditions .  Z oning res trictions  s top 
people from moving into (or urge  them to move out of ) the predicted 
path  of f uture s torm s .  
Insurers , w hether public or private, do not us ually exercis e s uch 
direct  means  of  control over the decis ions  of  property owners  and 
developers . Instead, ins urance is  a contract  that , if  w e l l  draf ted ,  creates  
incentives  f or ins ureds  to engage in precautionary  behavior s  that cos t 
les s  than the ris k they  reduce . Insurance contracts  can operate as  ex  ante 
regulation, s etting guidelines  f or conduct  bef ore los s  occurs  and 
requiring adherence to thes e guidel ines  a s  a condition f or coverage or f or 
premium dis counts .11  Insurance contracts  can als o operate as  ex  post 
regulation, determining the  eligibility of  claims  and the magnitude of  
recovery af ter los s  occurs.  
Interes ted in the w ays  ins urers  regulate behavior ex ante to 
improve  storm  preparedness , w e examin e the  regulatory tools  at their 
disposal. In this  s ection ,  w e  lay out the conceptual framew ork of  
regulation by ins urance, but draw  no dis tinction betw een private and 
public  weather ins uranc e.  Later, in P art II,  w e provide a comparative 
ins titutional analys is  of  public and  private ins urance  s ys tems , examining 
how  each utilizes  thes e regulatory tools . 
A. The Price of Weather : Underwriting Differentiated 
Premiums  
P rice is  the ultimate regulator of  conduct. At the f ront end of  the 
ins urance trans action, ins urers ’ mos t bas ic tool f or creating incentives  to 
reduce ris k is  the s etting of  dif f erentiated premiums. Insurers  charge 
low er premiums to policyholders  w ho f ace low er expected harm, thus  
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11  S o m e  g o v e r n m e n t  prog r a m s  prov i d e  a  f o r m  o f  i n s u r a n c e  t h a t  d o e s  n o t  f o l l o w  t h e  
s t a n d a r d  c o n t r a c t u a l  m o d e l  o f  i n s u r a n c e  c o v e r a g e. E x a mples  o f  s u c h  “ s o c i a l  
i n s u r a n c e ”  i n c l u d e  M e d i c a r e ,  S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y ,  a n d  s t a t e  u n e mploy m e n t  i n s u r a n c e.  
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inducing people to behave in w ays  that qualif y f or the dis counts . Auto 
ins urers , f or example,  provide dis counts  f or driving s af er cars , driving 
les s  of ten, and driving accident - f ree. Life  ins urers  charge low er 
premiums f or not s mo king or s cuba diving . And property ins urers  
dis count thef t and f ire coverage if  policyholders  ins tall s ecurity s ys tems  
and s moke detectors.  
In many areas  of  ins ured activity, the as s es s ment of  expected 
harms — and w hether the inves tment in their reduction is  cos t - j us tif ied —
is  a complicated ,  data - driven enterprise. Sometimes  expected los s es  
depend on unobs ervable idios yncratic f actors  bes t know n by the 
policyholders , making it dif f icult f or ins urers  to price policies accurately ,  
w hich in turn gives  ris e to advers e s election. 12  But as ymmetric 
inf ormation  is  generally not a problem in regards  to w eather ins urance. 
On the contrary, p roperty i ns urers , both private and public ,  typically 
have much of  the  ris k - relevant inf ormation  on  w eather hazards , 
inf ormation f ar  s uperior to that w hich home ow ners  have .   
If ins urance premiums vary according to the ris k attributed to the 
specific property, the ins urance policy can become a powerful regulator 
of  behavior. Differentiated premium regulate behavior  not by mandating 
par ticular conduct  or s af ety meas ure  as , s ay, building codes  do. Rather, 
they regulate behavior by pricing dif f erent conduct choices , making  it 
more cos tly f or people to choos e high - ris k cours es  of  action. 
Policyholders  are f ree to decide w hether or not  to ins tall s torm w indow s  
or roof  anchors ; no ins urance broker  is  going to tell them that they mus t. 
But they are given an incentive to choos e s ome s af ety meas ures , becaus e 
they incur both the cos t of  ins tallation and — through the premium 
dis count — the benef it of  ris k - reduction.  
Differentiated ins urance premiums operate in much the s ame w ay 
as  government - s et P igouvian taxes. By taxing conduct that imposes 
external cos ts  and harm to others , the government f orces  actors  to take 
thos e cos ts  into account and eith er reduce their level of  activity or f ind 
w ays  to mitigate the harms. 13    
Thus , in contras t to traditional command - and - control rulemaking, 
w here the regulator has  to decide w hether to mandate  a particular s af ety 
meas ure or not (w hich in turn requires  the re gulator to compare the  total  
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12  S e e  G e o r g e s  D i o n n e  e t  a l., A d v e r s e  S e l e ctio n  i n  I n s u r a n c e  C o ntra ctin g ,  i n  
H A N D B O O K  O F  I N S U R A N C E  2 3 1  ( G e o r g e s  D i o n n e  e d .,  2 0 1 3 ) ;  A l m a  C o h e n  &  P e t e r  
S i e g e l m a n ,  T e stin g  f o r  A d v e r s e  S e l e ctio n  i n  I n s u r a n c e  M a r k ets ,  7 7  J.  R I S K  &  I N S . 
3 9  ( 2 0 1 0 ).  
13  S e e ,  e . g . ,  H A R V E Y  S.  R O S E N ,  P U B L I C  F I N A N C E  ( 1 0 t h  e d. 2 0 1 3 ).  F o r  f u r t h e r  
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  h o w  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  i n s u r a n c e  prem i u m s  r eplic a t e  t h e  P i g o u v i a n  t a x  
approa c h ,  s e e  B e n - S h a h a r  &  L o g u e ,  s u p r a  n o t e  1 0 ,  a t  2 2 9 – 3 1.  
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benef it of  that s af ety meas ure w ith its  total cos t), ins urance regulation 
can avoid the  crude trade - of f  inherent in  binary choice  and market - w ide 
mandates .  That is , the  ins urance  regulator  needs  only to price the 
expected ris k  reduction as s ociated w ith each  s af ety inves tment  and let 
policyholders  s elf  s elect. Clients  f or w hom the premium reduction is  
more valuable than the neces s ary inves tment in the s af ety meas ure w ould 
make the inves tment ; others  w ould not. Zoning regulations , f or example, 
may require homes  to be built at particular elevation s ,  or may mandate 
the us e of  s tilts  or pilings to s urvive s torm s urges. Insurance regulation, 
by contras t, does  not mandate but provides a menu of  options — premium 
dis counts  to homes  that i nves t in dif f erent degrees  of  precautions. The 
sorting under this  menu approach avoids  the inef f iciency of  mandated, 
acros s - the - board, all - or - nothing s af ety requirements.   
Diff erentiated ris k - bas ed premiums can af f ect not only the level 
of  precautions , but  als o the level of  the ins ured’s  activity. This is  a 
general, trivial ef f ect of  prices: they s eparate people in to thos e w ho 
purchase and thos e w ho don’t. In the context of  w eather ins urance, this  
activity - calibrating ef f ect is  enormous ly important. A  crucial element  of  
humanity’s  preparedness  f or s evere w eather is  the determination  w here 
to live, and in particular ,  w here not  to live. If the cos t of  exposure to 
s evere w eather is  f ully captured by the ins urance rate, and thus  f ully 
borne by homeow ners , they w ould make optimal location decis ion s  
(prompted by their mortgage lenders  w ho require them to purchase f ull 
ins urance). The leis ure value of  oceanf ront living w ould be traded of f  
agains t the f ull cos t of  s uch living, w hich s hould include the f ull 
ins u rance cos t.  
Thus, dif f erentiated premiums are the primary tool available f or 
ins urers  to af f ect the ex  ante s af ety decis ions  of  their ins ureds. But to 
w ork ef f ectively, ins urers  mus t have the know - how  to adj us t premium s  
in accordance w ith f ine - tuned categ ories  of  ris k, and they mus t have the 
incentive to do s o accurately. We now  turn to examine thes e.  
 
B.  Pricing of Weather Insurance Policies  
Becaus e the primary ris k as s ociated w ith s evere w eather is  the 
ris k of  property damage, private w eather ris k ins uranc e is  s old mos tly 
though property ins urance policies, including homeow ners ’ and 
commercial property ins urance .  Homeow ners ’ policies, f or example, 
cover damage to the s tructure of  a home res ulting f rom all but a f ew  
excluded caus es.  Theref ore, w ith the exc eption of  f lood damage 
(dis cus s ed below ), mos t s torm - caus ed damage is  covered.  T he larges t 
s torm - related ris k ins ured by homeow ners ’  and commercial property 
policies is  the ris k of  w ind damage.  
! #, #!
Wind ris k varies  enormous ly by location . As a res ult, the portion 
of  a property ins urance premium corresponding to the ris k of  w ind 
damage is  highly contingent on the location  of  the property . For 
example, the larges t homeow ners ’ ins urance  premium increas es  in recent 
years  have been in the s tate s  w ith the mos t damage f rom s torms , 
O klahoma (becaus e of  its  location in “ T ornado A lley” 1 4 ) and F lorida 
( hurricanes ). 15  I nsurers  are experts in s torm and  w ind patterns , in part 
becaus e of  the decades  of  inf ormation that have been gathered in the 
process of  u nderw riting w eather coverage and adj us ting w eather claims .  
In addition, ins urers  have come as  clos e to be ing  experts in predicting 
the f uture of  w eather ris ks  as  s cience w ill permit.  They are pioneers in 
their ef f orts  to us e mathematical modeling to take  into account not only 
w eather predictions  but als o demographic trends  and cons truction 
practices .16  For example, insurance models  may es timate that a home 
w ith a hip ped  roof  (pyramid s hape)  would s us tain  f our percent les s  
damage than a home w ith a roof  w it h gable ends. 17  Based on s uch 
estimates , p roperty ins urance prices are adj us ted each renew al period, 
us ually each year, to ref lect the lates t inf ormation regarding overall 
w eather - related ris ks.  According to one s ource, f or example, flood 
ins urance s old by private ins urers  depends on s o many ris k and 
mitigation f actors  that the rating s heet us ed by brokers  to determine 
premiums is  thirty  pages long. 18  
Weather ins urance premiums are als o individualized to particular 
property owners . Factors  that af f ect ins urance pricing include, as  
mentioned, location, but not only general region of  the country , f or 
example, the plains of  O klahoma as  compared to the hills  of  Tennes s ee .  
Also important is  the property’s  specific location  w ithin a give n region .  
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14  “ T o r n a d o  A l l e y ”  i s  a  n i c k n a m e  g i v e n  t o  t h e  a r e a  i n  t h e  s o u t h e r n  plai n s  r e g i o n  o f  
t h e  U.S., i n c l u d i n g  n o r t h e r n  T e x a s ,  O k l a h o m a ,  K a n s a s ,  a n d  N e b r a s k a. T o r n a d o  
A l l e y ,  N A T ’ L  O C E A N I C  &  A T M O S P H E R I C  A D M I N .,  
h t tp://w w w.nc d c.no a a.go v / c l i m a t e - i n f o r m a t i o n / e x t r e m e - e v e n t s / u s - t o r n a d o -
c l i m a t o l o g y / t o r n a d o - a l l e y  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  N o v. 4 ,  2 0 1 4 ).  
15  T o p  5  States f o r  A uto, H o m e  I n s u r a n c e  R ate H i k e s  i n  2 0 1 3 :  P e r r & K n i g ht ,  
I N S U R A N C E  J O U R N A L  ( M a r. 1 2 ,  2 0 1 4 ) ,  
h t tp://w w w.in s u r a n c e j o u r n a l.co m / n e w s / n a t i o n a l / 2 0 1 4 / 0 3 / 1 2 / 3 2 3 0 4 3.htm.  
16  S e e  C a s s a n d r a  R. C o l e ,  D a v i d  A. M a cpher s o n  &  K a t h l e e n  A. M c C u l l o u g h ,  A  
C o m p a r i s o n  o f  H u r r i c a n e  L o s s  M o d e l s ,  3 3  J.  I N S . I S S U E S  3 1  ( 2 0 1 0 ) ;  A a r t i  D i n e s h ,  
H o w  C atastro p h e  E x p e rts M o d e l  H u r r i c a n e - I n d u c e d  Stor m  S u r g e ,  I N S U R A N C E  
J O U R N A L  ( J u l y  1 ,  2 0 1 3 ) ,  
h t tp://w w w.in s u r a n c e j o u r n a l.co m / m a g a z i n e s / f e a t u r e s / 2 0 1 3 / 0 7 / 0 1 / 2 9 6 7 8 7.htm . 
17  I d . ,  a t  3 8.  
18  U.S.  G O V ’ T  A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y  O F F I C E ,  G A O - 1 3 - 5 6 8 ,  F L O O D  I N S U R A N C E :  
I M P L I C A T I O N S  O F  C H A N G I N G  C O V E R A G E  L I M I T S  A N D  E X P A N D I N G  C O V E R A G E  1 5  
( 2 0 1 3 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  h t tp://w w w.ga o.go v / a s s e t s / 6 6 0 / 6 5 5 7 1 9 .pdf [ h e r e i n a f t e r  G A O -
1 3 - 5 6 8 ,  F L O O D  I N S U R A N C E ].  
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In addition , the price of  a homeow ners ’ policy on the coas ts  of  can be 
reduced dramatically if  the ins ured buys , builds , or renovates  a property  
according to particular cons truction specifications .19   There is  little doubt 
that property ins urance  location - bas ed pricing , by rais ing the cos t of  
ow ning or renting property on the s horeline,  has  af f ected the location 
decis ions , des ign choices , and cons truction methods  in s torm - prone 
areas.  
C. Developing and Implementing Weather Safety Tools  
P roperty ins urers  inves t cons iderable res ources  in res earching 
and developing techniques  f or minimizing the ris k of  w eather damage to 
homes  and bus ines s es.  Large ins urers  have their ow n development 
operations , and the indus try as  a w hole inves ts  collectiv ely through 
organizations  s uch as  the Ins urance Ins titute f or Bus ines s  and H ome 
S af ety (IBH S ). 20   Fas hioned af ter the model  of  the Ins urance Ins titute f or 
H ighw ay S af ety  (I H S ) , f amous  f or its  res earch into auto s af ety and 
especially its  cras h - tes ting and s a f ety rating of  new  automobiles , 2 1  the 
IBH S  res earches  how  bes t to cons truct buildings  to minimize various  
types of damage, especial ly damage f rom s evere w eather.   
One in novative res earch technique at IBH S , as  yet unmatched by 
government regulators , is  the high w ind tes t f acility at the IBH S  
Res earch Center in S outh Carolina.  At this  Center, IBH S  is  able to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19  F o r  e x a mple, a t  l e a s t  f o u r  s t a t e s  perm i t  property  i n s u r e r s  t o  d i s c o u n t  prem i u m s  i f  
t h e  i n s u r e d  property  i s  c e r t i f i e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  s t a n d a r d s  c r e a t e d  b y  t h e  i n s u r a n c e  
i n d u s t r y ’ s  r e s e a r c h  c e n t e r ,  t h e  I n s u r a n c e  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  B u s i n e s s  a n d  H o m e  S a f e t y. 
F O R T I F I E D  H o m e ™ :  H u r r i c a n  F i n a n c i a l  I n c e ntiv e s ,  I N S U R A N C E  I N S T I T U T E  F O R  
B U S I N E S S  &  H O M E  S A F E T Y ,  h t tp://w w w.dis a s t e r s a f e t y.or g / wp -
co n t e n t / uploa d s / F O R T I F I E D - H o m e - I n c e n t i v e s _ I B H S.pdf  ( l i s t i n g  A l a b a m a ,  
G e o r g i a ,  M i s s i s s ippi, a n d  N o r t h  C a r o l i n a  a s  s t a t e s  a l l o w i n g  o r  r e q u i r i n g  i n c e n t i v e  
prog r a m s  b y  i n s u r e r s  b a s e d  o n  I B H S  c e r t i f i c a t i o n ) ;  s e e  a l s o  F O R T I F I E D  O v e r v i e w ,  
I N S U R A N C E  I N S T I T U T E  F O R  B U S I N E S S  &  H O M E  S A F E T Y  
h t tps:// w w w.dis a s t e r s a f e t y.or g / f o r t i f i e d - m a i n /  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  D e c. 2 9 ,  2 0 1 4 )  
( e xplain i n g  t h e  I B H S  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  proc e s s ). I n  a d d i t i o n ,  F l o r i d a  r e q u i r e s  i n s u r e r s  t o  
prov i d e  w i n d  m i t i g a t i o n  d i s c o u n t s ,  up to  8 3 %  o f  prem i u m s ,  b a s e d  o n  a  v e r y  
d e t a i l e d  s e t  o f  c o n s t r u c t i o n  c r i t e r i a. S e e ,  e . g . ,  N otic e  o f  P r e m i u m  D i s c o u nts f o r  
H u r r i c a n e  L o s s ,  F L O R I D A  O F F I C E  O F  I N S U R A N C E  
R E G U L A T I O N ,  h t tp://w w w.flo i r.co m / s i t e d o c u m e n t s / o i r - b 1 - 1 6 5 5.pdf  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  
D e c. 2 9 ,  2 0 1 4 )  ( e xplain i n g  t o  F l o r i d a  i n s u r a n c e  purc h a s e r s  h o w  w i n d  m i t i g a t i o n  
prem i u m  d i s c o u n t s  a r e  c a l c u l a t e d ) ;  W i n d storm  L o s s  R e d u ctio n  C r e d its ,  F L O R I D A  
O F F I C E  O F  I N S U R A N C E  R E G U L A T I O N ,  h t tp://w w w.flo i r.co m / s i t e D o c u m e n t s / O I R -
B 1 - 1 6 9 9.xls  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  D e c. 2 9 ,  2 0 1 4 )  ( sprea d s h e e t  s h o w i n g  a c t u a l  c r e d i t  a m o u n t  
f o r  e a c h  specif i c  c o n s t r u c t i o n  c r i t e r i o n.)  
20  I N S U R A N C E  I N S T I T U T E  F O R  B U S I N E S S  &  H O M E  S A F E T Y ,  
h t tps:// w w w.dis a s t e r s a f e t y.or g  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  N o v. 4 ,  2 0 1 4 ).  
21  S a f ety R atin g s ,  I N S U R A N C E  I N S T I T U T E  F O R  H I G H W A Y  S A F E T Y ,  
h t tp://w w w.iih s.org / i i h s / r a t i n g s  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  N o v. 4 ,  2 0 1 4 ).  
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generate realis tic w ind hazards , including w inds  up to 130 mph. 22  This 
f acility has  permitted IBH S  to s tudy a range of  alternative cons truction 
methods  to determine w hich methods  bes t w iths tand high w inds.  As a 
res ult of  this  tes ting technology, IBH S  has  developed a program of  
cons truction certif ication that grades  s tr uctures  according to their ability 
to res is t high w inds , w ith certif ications  f rom bronze, to s ilver, to gold. 23   
The ratings  are us ed in a number of  s tates , w here ins urance regulators  
either permit or require  ins urers  to calculate premium dis counts  on the 
b as is  of  s uch  ratings .24  
Insurers , it turns  out, have a f inancial  s take not only in 
identif ying ef f ective cons truction innovations , but als o in s eeing thos e 
innovations  implemented by policyholders.  It is  only w hen new  and 
improved ris k reduction cons tructi on methods  are actually us ed that 
w eather - related ins urance claims  are reduced , thereby enabling  ins urers  
to compete more robus tly f or bus ines s  w ith low er premiums.  To 
encourage adoption  among policyholders , ins urers  as  mentioned  us e 
premium dis counts.  A nd to encourage adoption by policymakers , 
ins urers  rate the dif f erent localities ’ home - building s tandards.  To 
accomplish this ,  I BH S  collects  inf ormation regarding the building codes  
in dif f erent communities  and how  w ell thos e codes  are being enf orced  by 
local governments.  This inf ormation is  then us ed to generate building 
code  ef f ectivenes s  ratings , w hich individual ins urers  may then us e to 
price their coverage  w ithin the rated dis tricts .25  The indirect ef f ect of  
thes e ratings  is  to put pressure on s ta te and local governments  to tighten 
their building codes  and their enf orcement of  thes e building codes.  
It is  important to note that the building code ef f ectivenes s  rating 
is  done in coordination w ith indus try - ow ned Ins urance S ervices  O f f ice 
(IS O ) 2 6 — the bu reau  that collects  data and s hares  it w ithin the indus try to 
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22 R e s e a r c h  C e nter ,  I N S U R A N C E  I N S T I T U T E  F O R  B U S I N E S S  &  H O M E  S A F E T Y ,   
h t tp://w w w.dis a s t e r s a f e t y.or g / wp - co n t e n t / uploa d s / R S C _ o v e r v i e w _ I B H S.pdf.  
23  I B H S  F o rtifi e d  H o m e  H u r r i c a n e  P r o g r a m :  B r o n z e ,  S i l v e r  a n d  G o l d :  A n  
I n c r e m e ntal,  H o l i stic  A p p r o a c h  to R e d u c i n g  R e s i d e ntia l  P r o p e rty L o s s e s  i n  
H u r r i c a n e - P r o n e  A r e a s ,  I N S U R A N C E  I N S T I T U T E  F O R  B U S I N E S S  &  H O M E  S A F E T Y ,  
a v a i l a b l e  at  h t tp://w w w.dis a s t e r s a f e t y.or g / wp - co n t e n t / uploa d s / A T C -
F O R T I F I E D _ I B H S.pdf ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  D e c. 2 9 ,  2 0 1 4 ).  
24  S e e  s o u r c e s  c i t e d  s u p r a  n o t e  1 9 . 
25  S e e  R atin g  the  States:  A n  A s s e s s m e nt o f  R e s i d e ntia l  B u i l d i n g  C o d e  a n d  
E n f o r c e m e nt S y stem s  f o r  L i f e  S a f ety a n d  P r o p e rty P r otectio n  i n  H u r r i c a n e - P r o n e  
R e g i o n s ,  I N S U R A N C E  I N S T I T U T E  F O R  B U S I N E S S  &  H O M E  S A F E T Y  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp://w w w.dis a s t e r s a f e t y.or g / wp - co n t e n t / uploa d s / i b h s - r a t i n g - t h e - s t a t e s.pdf  
26  T h e  I S O ,  a m o n g  o t h e r  f u n c t i o n s ,  a s s e s s e s  t h e  b u i l d i n g  c o d e s  i n  e f f e c t  i n  a  
parti c u l a r  c o m m u n i t y  a n d  h o w  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  e n f o r c e s  i t s  b u i l d i n g  c o d e s ,  w i t h  
specia l  e mphas i s  o n  m i t i g a t i o n  o f  l o s s e s  f r o m  n a t u r a l  h a z a r d s.  B u i l d i n g  C o d e  
E f f e ctiv e n e s s  G r a d i n g  S c h e d u l e  ( B C E G S ® ) ,  I S O M I T I G A T I O N .CO M ,  
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as s is t in the pricing of  policies.  Through this  process , building code 
enf orcement and ins urance policy pricing are coordinated acros s  the 
entire indus try and linked to the bes t available inf orma tion regarding los s  
prevention. 27  For example, in rating local building codes , the IS O - I BH S  
methodology collects  data on the type of foundation the j uris diction 
mandates  f or building in the f loodplain, how  it addres s es  post - disas ter 
recons truction permits, the f unding it allocates  to building code 
enf orcement,  how  it trains  its  inspectors, and the s tandards  it us es  to 
review  des ign of  new  cons truction. 28  
In s um, the bus ines s  of  ins urance is  as  much about ris k 
management as  it is  about pooling of  ris k. The des ign of  ins urance pools 
requires  accurate ris k rating and pricing, prompting ins urers  to make 
their products s ens itive to the various  mitigation ef f orts  and activity 
choices  of  their clients. The combination of  acces s  to inf ormation and 
competitive pressures  to of f er af f ordable premiums generate a 
f ramew ork in w hich ins urers  act as  private regulators  of  w eather ris k.  
 
II. G OVERNMENT -PROVIDED W EATHER INSURANCE  
  
The previous part examined the tools  that providers  of  ins urance 
contracts  us e to regulate behavior  bef ore w eather dis as ter s  s trike , w ith 
the primary tool being ins urers ’ ability to rate ris ks — to charge relatively 
high premiums f or properties located in high - ris k areas  or properties that 
lack  s t a t e - of - the - art w eather mitigation f eatures.   In this  part we f ocus  in 
particular on government - provided w eather ris k ins urance, des cribing 
three exis ting ins titutions : f ederal dis as ter relief , the N ational F lood 
Ins urance P rogram, and F lorida’s  Citizens  P roperty Ins urance 
Corporation.    
Why, you might w onder, is  the government involved  in w eather 
ins urance in the f irs t place?  Why not leave all w eather ris k ins urance to 
the private market?  There are s everal rationales  commonly of f ered to 
j us tif y governments  acting as  ins urers  of  w eather ris k .   
F irs t, it is  s ometimes  argued that truly catas trophic weather 
events  are s uf f iciently rare that property owners  s ys tematicall y 
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h t tp://w w w.is o m i t i g a t i o n.co m / b c e g s / 0 0 0 0 / b c e g s 0 0 0 1.htm l  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  N o v. 4 ,  
2 0 1 4 ).  
27  S e e  i d . 
28  S e e  B u i l d i n g  C o d e  E f f e ctiv e n e s s  G r a d i n g  S c h e d u l e  ( B C E G S ® )  Q u e stio n n a i r e  
( I S O  P r operti e s ,  I n c. 2 0 0 4 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp://w w w.is r b.co m /pubs / B C E G S % 2 0 Q u e s t i o n n a i r e.pdf . 
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underes timate the ris k. 29   According to this  behavioral  account , 
purchasers  of  w eather ins urance do not f ully appreciate the ris k of  s evere 
w eather  and are theref or e  un w illing to pay actuarially f air premiums that 
ins urers ’ require to provide coverage . In deed, only 20  percent  of  all U.S. 
homes are covered by f lood ins urance , despite the f act that f loods  can 
caus e los s es  that hous ehold w ould be unable to recover f rom abs ent 
ins urance .30    
Second,  the problem may lie not w ith the demand  f or , but rather 
w ith the s upply of f lood coverage. I t is s ometimes  argued that w eather 
calamities  are s imply too large — or correlated — to be ins ured through 
private markets.  Insurers  may  not w ant to be in the market f or s evere 
w eather ins urance  becaus e they cannot abs orb the ri s k through their 
conventional pooling methods .   
Third,  government provision of  w eather ins urance may be 
neces s ary f or af f ordability  (redis tributive)  reas ons. Even if  policyholders  
w ere s eeking  to purchase  and ins urers  w ere w illing to provide actuarially 
priced weather dis as ter ins urance, many policyholders  s imply could not 
af f ord s uch coverage, especially in areas  w here the ris k is  large and thus  
cos tly to ins ure. 31   
Thes e rationales  purport to  provide the theoretical bas is  f or 
government - provided w eather - r is k ins urance.  What f orm the 
government - provided ins urance s hould take is  a s eparate ques tion.  In 
the remainder of  this  P art, w e dis cus s  s everal dif f erent models  of  
government - provided w eather ins urance.  In the f irs t — direct government 
relief  f or dis as ter los s es — there is  no contractual element.  In the other 
two  programs  (f lood and w ind ins urance), the government  acts  like an 
ins urance company: iss uing (or s ubs idizing the is s uan ce of ) actual 
ins urance contracts , charging premiums, and paying coverage only to its  
premium - paying clients . As we dis cus s  thes e exis ting arrangements , w e 
continue to revis it the underlying rationales  f or government intervention 
and examine their validity . 
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29  S e e  J o s h u a  A a r o n  R a n d l e t t ,  C o m m e n t ,  F a i r  A c c e s s  to I n s u r a n c e  R e q u i r e m e nts ,  
1 5  O C E A N  &  C O A S T A L  L.J . 1 2 7  ( 2 0 1 0 )  ( d e s c r i b i n g  priv a t e  i n s u r e r s ’  w i t h d r a w a l  
f r o m  c o a s t a l  M a s s a c h u s e t t s  m a r k e t s ,  l e a v i n g  r e s i d e n t s  w i t h  o n l y  a  s t a t e  a g e n c y  
f r o m  w h i c h  t o  purc h a s e  property  i n s u r a n c e ) ;  M i c h a e l  A. B r o w n ,  N o t e ,  A n ythin g  
b ut a  B r e e z e :  M o v i n g  F o r w a r d  W itho ut N F I P  P r o g r a m ,  3 7  B.C.  E N V T L . A F F . L.  
R E V . 3 6 5  ( 2 0 1 0 ) ;  s e e  a l s o  H O W A R D  C.  K U N R E U T H E R  E T  A L .,  I N S U R A N C E  &  
B E H A V I O R A L  E C O N O M I C S  1 1 3 – 1 6  ( 2 0 1 3 )  ( d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  d e m a n d  a n o m a l y  o f  
f a i l u r e  t o  prote c t  a g a i n s t  l o w - prob a b i l i t y ,  h i g h - c o n s e q u e n c e  e v e n t s ) ;  c f .  M u n i c h  R e ,  
N atura l  C atastro p h e s  2 0 1 0 :  A n a l y s e s ,  A s s e s s m e nts, P o s itio n s ,  T O P I C S  G E O ,  F e b. 
2 0 1 1 ,  a t  6  ( d e s c r i b i n g  h o w  v o l c a n i c  e r uptio n s  a r e  “ a n  u n d e r e s t i m a t e d  r i s k ” ).  
30  S e e  F l o o d  I n s u r a n c e ,  h t tp://e n.w ik ipedia.org / w i k i / F l o o d _ i n s u r a n c e.  
31  S e e  R i c h a r d  A. D e r r i g  e t. a l ,  C atastr o p h e  M a n a g e m e nt in  a  C h a n g i n g  W o r l d ,  1 1  
R I S K  M A N A G E M E N T  &  I N S . R E V . 2 6 9 ,  2 7 2  ( 2 0 0 8 ).  
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A. Government Disaster Relief  
The broades t f orm of  f ederally provided w eather  ris k ins urance is  
dis as ter relief. Federal d is as ter relief  provides benef its  to all parties w ho 
s uf f er qualif ying los s es , up to statutory or regulatory limits , w ith no 
requirement of  buying ins urance or paying premiums .  The F ederal 
Emergency M anagement A gency (F EM A ) operates the  D is as ter Relief  
F und 3 2  to rebuild inf ras tructure and to provide relief  to individuals  and 
private bus ines s es. Becaus e the D is as ter Rel ief  F und does  not collect 
ins urance premiums in advance, it operates as  a f orm of  s ocial ins urance, 
w hereby relief  payments are  f unded by tax revenues .33   
The F und  provides grants  to individuals  and hous eholds  of  up to 
$3 0,0 00 to cover unins ured los s es  res ulting f rom any s ingle emergency 
that is  declared a dis as ter by the P res ident . 3 4  As los s es  of ten f ar exceed 
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32  S e e  D i s a ster  R e l i e f  F u n d :  M o nthly  R e p o rt ,  F E D . E M E R G E N C Y  M G M T . A G E N C Y , 
h t tp://w w w.fe m a.go v / d i s a s t e r - r e l i e f - f u n d  ( l a s t  update d  D e c. 9 ,  2 0 1 4 ) ;  P u b l i c  
A s s i stan c e :  L o c a l ,  State, T r i b a l ,  a n d  N o n - P r o f it ,  F E D . E M E R G E N C Y  M G M T . 
A G E N C Y ,  h t tp://w w w.fe m a.go v /publi c - a s s i s t a n c e - l o c a l - s t a t e - t r i b a l - a n d - n o n - prof i t  
( l a s t  update d  J u l y  2 4 ,  2 0 1 4 ) . T h e  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  c o v e r s  o n l y  7 5  perc e n t  o f  
d i s a s t e r - r e l a t e d  e xpens e s ,  w h i l e  s t a t e s  h a v e  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  2 5  perc e n t. 
S e e  4 2  U.S.C. §  5 1 7 4 ( g )  ( 2 0 1 3 ). S t a t e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  c a n  petit i o n  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  
f e d e r a l  s h a r e  a s  h i g h  a s  1 0 0  perc e n t.  
33  T h e  D i s a s t e r  R e l i e f  F u n d  w a s  c r e a t e d  b y  t h e  R o b e r t  T. S t a f f o r d  D i s a s t e r  R e l i e f  
a n d  E m e r g e n c y  A s s i s t a n c e  A c t ,  4 2  U.S.C § §  5 1 2 1 – 5 2 0 8  ( 2 0 1 3 ).  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  
S t a f f o r d  A c t ,  e a c h  s t a t e ,  t h r o u g h  i t s  g o v e r n o r ,  m u s t  r e q u e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  f r o m  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t. I d .  a t  §  5 1 7 0. A s  part o f  t h i s  r e q u e s t ,  t h e  s t a t e  m u s t  a s s e r t  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  
h a s  a n  e m e r g e n c y  plan  t h a t  h a s  b e e n  i mplem e n t e d ,  b u t  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e ’ s  plan  i s  n o t  
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  m e e t  t h e  n e e d  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  t h e  d i s a s t e r .    
34  S e e  g e n e r a l l y  D i s a ster  L o a n  P r o g r a m ,  U.S.  S M A L L  B U S I N E S S  A D M I N I S T R A T I O N ,  
h t tp://w w w.sb a.go v / c o n t e n t / d i s a s t e r - l o a n - prog r a m  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  N o v. 5 ,  2 0 1 4 ) .  
F e d e r a l  d i s a s t e r  d e c l a r a t i o n s  o c c u r  w i t h  s o m e  f r e q u e n c y.  B e t w e e n  2 0 0 4  a n d  2 0 1 1 ,  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  r e c e i v e d  s t a t e  r e q u e s t s  f o r  6 2 9  d i s a s t e r  d e c l a r a t i o n s ,  o f  w h i c h  5 3 9  ( o r  
8 6  perc e n t )  w e r e  approv e d.  B e c a u s e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  d i s a s t e r  d e c l a r a t i o n s  a r e  m a d e  
o n e  s t a t e  a t  a  t i m e ,  m a n y  o f  d e c l a r a t i o n s  a r e  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  s i n g l e  s t o r m s  t h a t  
a f f e c t e d  m u l t iple s t a t e s.  F o r  e x a mple, o f  t h e  5 3 9  d e c l a r a t i o n s  i s s u e d ,  r o u g h l y  h a l f  
o f  t h e  F E M A  payo u t s  ( $ 4 0  b i l l i o n  o f  t h e  t o t a l  $ 8 0  b i l l i o n )  w e r e  f o r  K a t r i n a - r e l a t e d  
l o s s e s  a l o n e. U .S.  G O V ’ T  A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y  O F F I C E ,  G A O - 1 2 - 8 3 8 ,  F E D E R A L  
D I S A S T E R  A S S I S T A N C E :  I M P R O V E D  C R I T E R I A  N E E D E D  T O  A S S E S S  A  J U R I S D I C T I O N ’ S  
C A P A B I L I T Y  T O  R E S P O N D  A N D  R E C O V E R  O N  I T S  O W N  1 4  ( 2 0 1 2 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at 
h t tp://w w w.ga o.go v / a s s e t s / 6 5 0 / 6 4 8 1 6 2.pdf. F o r  H u r r i c a n e  S a n d y ,  F E M A  payo u t s  
o n e  y e a r  a f t e r  t h e  e v e n t  t o t a l e d  m o r e  t h a n  $ 1.4 b i l l i o n  i n  i n d i v i d u a l  a s s i s t a n c e  a n d  
$ 2.4 b i l l i o n  i n  S B A  l o a n s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  $ 7.9 b i l l i o n  i n  N F I P  payo u t s  t o  f l o o d  polic y  
h o l d e r s  a n d  $ 3.2 b i l l i o n  t o  f u n d  e m e r g e n c y  w o r k ,  d e b r i s  r e m o v a l ,  a n d  r epa ir  a n d  
r eplac e m e n t  o f  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e. S e e  H u r r i c a n e  S a n d y :  T i m e l i n e ,  F E D . E M E R G E N C Y  
M G M T . A G E N C Y ,  h t tp://w w w.fe m a.go v / h u r r i c a n e - s a n d y - t i m e l i n e  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  N o v. 
5 ,  2 0 1 4 ).  
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thes e grants , the F und als o provides loans — up to $200,000 f or 
hous eholds  and $2 million f or bus ines s es — t o cover the uni ns ured cos ts  
of  repair ing  or replac ing  damaged property .35   
Another f orm  of  dis as ter relief  comes  f rom charitable 
contributions  to aid dis as ter victims.  These originate  f rom private 
donors  and not  f rom the government , but they are heavily s ubs idized by 
f ederal tax policy — mos t notably  the charitable contribution deduction .  
Not s urprising ly ,  the magnitude of  charitable dis as ter aid is  larges t 
s hortly af ter the occurrence of  highly unus ual catas trophes that elicit 
public sympathy . Examples of post - disas ter  spike s  in charitable 
contributions  include maj or earthquakes  and ts unamis , 3 6  as well as 
devas tating s torms  s uch as  K atrina and the J oplin, Mis s ouri and 
Tus caloos a, A labama t ornadoes. 37  However, a lthough charitable dis as ter 
relief  can grow  very large, it ten ds  to be (perhaps always  is ) dw arf ed by 
government relief  as  w ell as  by private ins urance payouts. 38    
T he U.S. government has  attempted to increas e the role of  
charitable dis as ter relief  by introducing new  tax s ubs idies.  Contributions  
to dis as ter victims  through qualif ied charities  have alw ays  been tax 
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35  4 2  U.S.C. §  5 1 7 4 ( h )  ( 2 0 1 3 )  ( s e t t i n g  m a x i m u m  d i s a s t e r  r e l i e f  a w a r d  a t  $ 2 5 , 0 0 0  
per d i s a s t e r ,  a d j u s t e d  a n n u a l l y  f o r  i n f l a t i o n ). I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  r epair s  a n d  
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  F E M A  w i l l  c o v e r  t e mpora r y  h o u s i n g  a s  w e l l  a s ,  d i s a s t e r - r e l a t e d  
m e d i c a l ,  c l o t h i n g ,  f u e l ,  m o v i n g  a n d  s t o r a g e ,  a n d  e v e n  b u r i a l  e xpens e s. D i s a ster  
A s s i stan c e  A v a i l a b l e  f r o m  F E M A ,  F E D . E M E R G E N C Y  M G M T . A G E N C Y ,   
h t tp://w w w.fe m a.go v / d i s a s t e r - a s s i s t a n c e - a v a i l a b l e - f e m a  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  N o v. 5 ,  2 0 1 4 ).  
36  S e e  M O L L Y  F.  S H E R L O C K ,  C O N G . R E S E A R C H  S E R V .,  R 4 1 0 3 6 ,  C H A R I T A B L E  
C O N T R I B U T I O N S  F O R  H A I T I ’ S  E A R T H Q U A K E  V I C T I M S  ( 2 0 1 0 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp: //f a s.or g / s gp/cr s / m i s c / R 4 1 0 3 6.pdf; D a n s h e r a  C o r d s ,  C h a r itab l e  C o ntrib utio n s  
f o r  D i s a ster  R e l i e f ,  5 7  C A T H . U.  L.  R E V . 4 2 7 ,  4 4 7 – 5 0  ( 2 0 0 8 ) ;  B r i t t  R e i e r s g o r d ,  
T e c h n o l o g y  a n d  D i s a ster :  T h e  C a s e  o f  H a iti a n d  the  R i s e  o f  T e xt M e s s a g e  R e l i e f  
D o n atio n s  ( U n i v e r s i t y  o f  D e n v e r  C a s e - Specif i c  B r i e f i n g  P aper, 2 0 1 1 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at   
h t tps:// w w w.du.ed u / k o r b e l / c r i i c / h u m a n i t a r i a n b r i e f s / b r i t t r e i e r s g o r d.pdf.  
37  S e e  D a n i e l  J. S m i t h  &  D a n i e l  S u t t e r ,  R e s p o n s e  a n d  R e c o v e r y  A fter the  J o p l i n  
T o r n a d o ,  1 8  I N D E P . R E V . 1 6 5  ( 2 0 1 3 ).  
38  F o r  e x a mple, h u r r i c a n e  K a t r i n a ,  w h i c h  w a s  t h e  m o s t  e xpens i v e  d i s a s t e r  i n  U.S. 
h i s t o r y ,  l e d  t o  c h a r i t a b l e  r e l i e f  o f  r o u g h l y  $ 2.5 b i l l i o n. U.S. G O V ’ T  
A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y  O F F I C E ,  G A O - 0 6 - 2 9 7 T ,  H U R R I C A N E S  K A T R I N A  A N D  R I T A :  
P R O V I S I O N  O F  C H A R I T A B L E  A S S I S T A N C E  ( 2 0 0 5 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp://w w w.ga o.go v / n e w.ite m s / d 0 6 2 9 7 t.pdf . T h e  f e d e r a l  d i s a s t e r  r e l i e f ,  b y  
c o mparis o n ,  f o r  t h e  2 0 0 5  h u r r i c a n e  s e a s o n ,  e x c e e d e d  $ 1 0 0  b i l l i o n. M A T T  
F E L L O W E S  &  A M Y  L I U ,  B R O O K I N G S  I N S T I T U T I O N ,  F E D E R A L  A L L O C A T I O N S  I N  
R E S P O N S E  T O  K A T R I N A ,  R I T A  A N D  W I L M A :  A N  U P D A T E  ( 2 0 0 6 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp://w w w.br o o k i n g s.ed u / ~ / m e d i a / r e s e a r c h / f i l e s / r eports / 2 0 0 6 / 8 / m e t r opolit a npolic
y % 2 0 f e l l o w e s / 2 0 0 6 0 7 1 2 _ k a t r i n a f a c t s h e e t.pdf . B y  f u r t h e r  c o mparis o n ,  priv a t e  
i n s u r a n c e  c o v e r a g e  f o r  K a t r i n a  t o t a l e d  $ 4 1.1 b i l l i o n. R o b e r t  P. H a r t w i g  &  C l a i r e  
W i l k i n s o n ,  H u r r i c a n e  K atrin a :  T h e  F i v e  Y e a r  A n n i v e r s a r y  2  ( I n s. In f o. In s t. 2 0 1 0 ) ,  
a v a i l a b l e  at  h t tp://w w w.iii.org / s i t e s / d e f a u l t / f i l e s / 1 0 0 7 K a t r i n a 5 A n n i v e r s a r y.pdf.  
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deductible, in the s ame w ay that all charitable contributions  are tax 
deductible w ithin limits.  More recently, how ever, legis lation has  been 
enacted specifically to increas e the tax s ubs idy f or dis as ter - rel ated 
giving. 39   Under thes e new  law s , f or example, whereas  charitable 
contribution  deduction s  are generally capped at 50  percent  of  adj us ted 
gros s  income f or individuals , there is  no s uch limitation f or contributions  
to dis as ter relief.  
 
B. Government -Provided Contractual Insurance   
The government is  als o in the bus ines s  of  s elling w eather - ris k 
ins urance, f illing in f or a real or perceived gap in the s upply of private 
ins urance. Unlike f reely provided dis as ter relief , government - s old 
ins urance contracts  need not burden taxpayers. Indeed the presence of  
w idespread ins urance coverage can reduce  budget s tres s  on ex  post relief  
f unds .  We f ocus  the dis cus s ion below  on tw o specific government 
ins urance programs: the F ederal f lood ins urance and the F lorid a  w i n d 
ins urance plans.  
1 . T he National Flood Ins ur ance Pr ogr am  
P rior to the adoption of  f ederally provided f lood policies , f lood 
ris ks  w ere covered through private ins urance contracts  s old by 
commercial ins urance companies.  But they w ere not part of the bas ic  
homeow ners  ins urance policy; ins tead, they had to be purchased as  an 
added coverage, priced separately. Becaus e, as  w e explained above,  
many property owners  opted not to purchase  the f lood  coverage, the 
f ederal government dis as ter relief  f und w as  called u pon for f lood relief  
w hen the big f loods  eventually hit.  T he N ational F lood Ins urance 
P rogram ( N F IP )  w as  created  to provide relief  f rom f lood los s es  in a w ay 
that minimized the f inancial burden on f ederal taxpayers.    
Through the N F IP , the f ederal governm ent s ells  f lood ins urance 
policies to res idential and commercial property .  Although N F IP  policies 
are marketed largely, though not entirely, through private ins urance 
companies, they are f ully underw ritten by the f ederal government. 40  
Unlike private ins urance policies generally, w hich provide varying levels  
of  coverage amounts  depending on ris k and demand, coverage under 
N F IP  f lood policies is  s tatutorily capped at $350,000 f or homeow ners  
($250,000 f or the res idence its elf  and another $100,000 f or contents ) and 
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39  K a t r i n a  E m e r g e n c y  T a x  R e l i e f  A c t  o f  2 0 0 5 ,  P u b. L. N o. 1 0 9 -  
7 3 ,  1 1 9  S t a t. 2 0 1 6 ;  G u l f  Opportu n i t y  Z o n e  A c t  o f  2 0 0 5 ,  P u b. L. N o. 1 0 9 -  1 3 5 ,  1 1 9  
S t a t. 2 5 7 7.  
40  G A O ,  F L O O D  I N S U R A N C E ,  s u p r a  n o t e  1 8 ,  a t  4. T h e r e  i s  a  s m a l l  priv a t e  i n s u r a n c e  
m a r k e t  t h a t  prov i d e s  c o v e r a g e  f o r  h o m e  v a l u e s  i n  e x c e s s  o f  t h e  c e i l i n g  u n d e r  t h e  
N F I P. I d .  
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$1 million f or commercial property owners  ($500,000 each f or buildings  
and contents ). 41    
Als o unlike private property ins urance markets , w here rates  are 
s et primarily by market f orces , w ith N F IP  f lood policies F E M A  s ets  and 
adj us ts  the rates .  If the premiums collected in a given year exceed the 
amount needed to cover f lood claims , the exces s  is  passed on to the 
Treas ury D epartment. Otherw is e, if  the amount of  los s  claims  exceeds  
premiums collected, the N F IP  has  the authority to ( and does ) borrow  
f rom the Treas ury to cover claims. In such cas e s , the N F IP  is  obligated 
to pay back over time, perhaps by rais ing rates.  As a res ult, the U.S. 
taxpayer is currently the reins urer of  truly catas trophic flood ris ks.  NFIP 
policies w ere, and s till are , underpriced in c omparison w ith the actual 
ris ks.   Becaus e of  this  f act  (about w hich w e w ill have more to s ay 
below ) , N F IP  policies  have come to dominate the f lood ris k market. 42    
In addition  to providing af f ordable f lood coverage , the N F IP  
s eeks  to incentivize f lood mitigation. To participate in the program and 
to entitle their res ident s  to buy s ubs idized N F IP  policies, communities  
are required adopt and enf orce a f loodplain management ordinance to 
reduce f uture f lood ris ks  to new  cons truction. In thes e areas , new  
cons truction and s ubs tantial improvements  mus t conf orm to N F IP ’s  
building s tandards. For example, the low es t f loor of  a s tructure mus t  be 
elevated to or above the “ bas e f lood elevation ” —  the level at w hich 
there is  a 1 percent chance of  f looding in a given year.  
To further mitigate the problem of  f lood ins urance coverage gaps, 
Congres s  decided to make the purch ase of  N F IP  policies manda tory  f or 
properties that are in certain f lood zones  and that are s ubj ect to  f ederally 
regulated mortgages. 43  Such mandatory f lood ins urance is  intended to 
protect the value of  the collateral that home lenders  and guarantors  rely 
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41  I d . at 9.  
42  A c c o r d i n g  t o  a  R A N D  s t u d y  publi s h e d  i n  2 0 0 6 ,  a l m o s t  a l l  o f  t h e  f l o o d  polic i e s  
o n  s i n g l e  f a m i l y  h o m e s  ( S F H s )  i n  specia l  f l o o d  h a z a r d  a r e a s  ( S F H A s )  w e r e  N F I P  
polic i e s.  Specif i c a l l y ,  t h e  s t u d y  f o u n d  t h a t  4 9  perc e n t  o f  a l l  S F H s  i n  S F H A s  h a d  
N F I P  polic i e s  a n d  a n o t h e r  1  t o  3  perc e n t  h a d  priv a t e  polic i e s.  L L O Y D  D I X O N ,  
N O R E E N  C L A N C Y ,  S E T H  A.  S E A B U R Y  &  A D R I A N  O V E R T O N ,  R A N D ,  T H E  
N A T I O N A L  F L O O D  I N S U R A N C E  P R O G R A M ’ S  M A R K E T  P E N E T R A T I O N  R A T E :  
E S T I M A T E S  A N D  P O L I C Y  I M P L I C A T I O N S  ( 2 0 0 6 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp://w w w.ra n d.org / c o n t e n t / d a m / r a n d /pubs / t e c h n i c a l _ r eports / 2 0 0 6 / R A N D _ T R 3 0 0
.su m.pdf. T h e  prim a r y  e x c eptio n  i s  f l o o d  r i s k  polic i e s  s o l d  o n  v e r y  e xpens i v e  
h o u s e s ,  t h e  v a l u e  o f  w h i c h  e x c e e d s  t h e  m a x i m u m  a m o u n t  i n s u r a b l e  u n d e r  t h e  
N F I P.  
43  T h e  f l o o d  i n s u r a n c e  m a n d a t e  w a s  f i r s t  a d d e d  a s  part o f  t h e  F l o o d  D i s a s t e r  
P r o t e c t i o n  A c t  o f  1 9 7 3 ,   P u b. L. N o. 9 3 - 2 3 4 ,  §  1 0 2 ,  8 7  S t a t. 9 7 5 ,  9 7 9  ( c o d i f i e d  a t  
4 2  U.S.C §  4 0 1 2 a ).  I t  w a s  s t r e n g t h e n e d  b y  t h e  F l o o d  I n s u r a n c e  R e f o r m  A c t  o f  
1 9 9 4 ,  P u b. L. N o. 1 0 3 - 3 2 5 ,  § §  5 0 1 – 5 8 4 ,  1 0 8  S t a t. 2 1 6 0 ,  2 2 5 5 – 8 7.  
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on w hen is s uing a home  mortg age loan. 44  (Why the purchase of  f lood 
ins urance needs  to be mandated is  not clear. Private lenders , w ho s tand 
to los e their collateral if  it is  unins ured, are s urely s ophisticated enough 
to add f lood ins urance to the of ten lengthy lis t of  ins urance coverages  
they require f rom borrow ers ).   
Unlike private ins urers , the N F IP  cannot rej ect applicants. It als o 
does  not have the f lexibility to  adj us t premiums to match the f ull ris k. 
These tw o f actors  create an advers e s election problem — ins ured 
properties a re more likely to exp ect loss es  exceeding their prem iums.  
Becaus e of  thes e advers e s election problems and the underpricing of  
f lood coverage  in the mos t ris k - prone areas , the  N F IP  is  operating at a 
mas s ive def icit , es timated in 2014 to be around $24 billion .  Moreover, 
given recent legis lative events  (dis cus s ed below ) there appears to be no 
prospect of that debt being repaid any time s oon , or that the chronic 
underpricing problem w ould be alleviated .45    
The rates  charged by N F IP  to its  policyholders  a re bas ed on 
f lood maps that are created and maintained by F EM A. 46  Thos e map s are 
bas ed on F EM A ’s  s tatis tical s tudies  of  river f low s , rainf all, s torm tides , 
and hydrologic f actors. 47   The maps themselves  identif y , among other 
things ,  “ special f lood hazard areas ”  (S F H A s ), in w hich there is  roughly a 
1  percent  chance of  f lood each year and a 25  percent  chance of  f lood 
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44  T h e  f l o o d  i n s u r a n c e  m a n d a t e  h a s  n o t  b e e n  w e l l  e n f o r c e d ,  f o r  r e a s o n s  d i s c u s s e d  
b e l o w.  A l s o ,  t h e r e  u s e d  t o  b e  a  f e d e r a l  m a n d a t e  t h a t  c r op in s u r a n c e  b e  purc h a s e d ,  
b u t  t h i s  g e n e r a l  m a n d a t e  w a s  r epeale d  i n  1 9 9 6. 7  U.S.C. §  1 5 1 9 ,  r e p e a l e d  b y  P u b. 
L. N o. 1 0 4 - 1 2 7 ,  §  1 9 6 ( j ) ,  1 1 0  S t a t. 8 8 8 ,  9 5 0  ( 1 9 9 6 ).  
45  G O V ’ T  A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y  O F F I C E ,  G A O - 1 4 - 2 9 7 R ,  O V E R V I E W  O F  G A O ' S  P A S T  
W O R K  O N  T H E  N A T I O N A L  F L O O D  I N S U R A N C E  P R O G R A M  1  ( 2 0 1 4 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp://w w w.ga o.go v / a s s e t s / 6 7 0 / 6 6 2 4 3 8.pdf . F E M A  i s  a u t h o r i z e d  t o  b o r r o w  f r o m  
t h e  T r e a s u r y  D epartm e n t  w h e n  N F I P  payo u t s  e x c e e d  c o l l e c t e d  prem i u m s.  S i n c e  
t h e  h u r r i c a n e s  o f  2 0 0 5 ,  t h i s  b o r r o w i n g  l i m i t  h a s  b e e n  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  $ 2  b i l l i o n  t o  
$ 3 0  b i l l i o n. I d .  a t  9. T h e  B i g g e r t - W a t e r s  A c t ,  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  t e x t  b e l o w ,  r e q u i r e d  
F E M A  t o  put f o r w a r d  a  plan  b y  J a n u a r y  o f  2 0 1 3  f o r  r epayin g  t h i s  d e b t . T h a t  h a s  
n o t  h appene d. In  f a c t ,  F E M A  i s  n o t  e v e n  c o l l e c t i n g  e n o u g h  i n  f l o o d  i n s u r a n c e  
prem i u m s  t o  c o v e r  t h e  i n t e r e s t  paym e n t s  o n  t h e  d e b t.  I d .  a t  9 – 1 1  ( d i s c u s s i n g  
F E M A ’ s  t r o u b l e d  d e b t  w i t h  T r e a s u r y ).  
46  N atio n a l  F l o o d  I n s u r a n c e  P r o g r a m ,  F E D . E M E R G E N C Y  M G M T . A G E N C Y ,  
h t tp://w w w.fe m a.go v / n a t i o n a l - f l o o d - i n s u r a n c e - prog r a m - f l o o d - h a z a r d - m apping  
( l a s t  update d  O c t. 2 3 ,  2 0 1 4 ) ;  F l o o d i n g  a n d  F l o o d  R i s k s :  U n d e r stan d i n g  F l o o d  
M a p s ,  N A T ’ L  F L O O D  I N S . P R O G R A M ,  
h t tps:// w w w.flo o d s m a r t.go v / f l o o d s m a r t /page s / f l o o d i n g _ f l o o d _ r i s k s / u n d e r s t a n d i n g _
f l o o d _ m aps.jsp(la s t  v i s i t e d  N o v. 6 ,  2 0 1 4 ).  
47  N A T ’ L  F L O O D  I N S . P R O G R A M ,  s u p r a  n o t e  4 9.  
! #$, #!
over the cours e of  30 years — the length of  mos t home mortgages. 48   
Thes e are the areas  in w hich mortgage lenders  are s uppo sed to mandate 
coverage and w here the f lood ins urance rates  are s upposed to be the 
highes t.  
There are at leas t three s erious  problems w ith the N F IP ’s  us e of  
f lood maps in pricing policies.  First, the maps themselves  are of ten out 
of  date , w hich produces t w o types of errors — s ome properties w rongly 
being deemed f lood - f ree and others  w rongly deemed f lood - prone . 49   
Second, even w hen the maps are updated, there are cros s - s ubs idies  
among ins ureds  w ithin the s ys tem .  FEMA its elf  admits  that  a s ub s tantial 
percen tage of  property owners  in high - ris k areas  w ere paying well below  
actuarial rates. 50  While a  2012  ref orm intended  to correct this  actuarial 
dis crepancy, legis lation in 2014 es s entially postponed such ref orm  
indef initely , and probably killed it . Third, even if  the F EM A  maps are 
updated and the rates  are made more actuarially s ound, political 
inf luence w ill continue to interf ere in  the process of  characterizing 
particular areas  as  f lood - prone. 51   
In response to years  of  complaints about and s tudies  documenting 
the inef f iciencies  inherent in the N F IP , law makers  in 2012 responded by 
enacting the s o - called Biggert - Waters  F lood Ins urance Ref orm A ct 
(BW). 52   BW s ought  to gradually  eliminate  the underf unding of  the N F IP  
and curb the dis turbing  cros s - s ubs idies  built int o the program .  For 
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48  F l o o d  Z o n e s ,  F E D . E M E R G E N C Y  M G M T . A G E N C Y ,  
h t tp://w w w.fe m a.go v / f l o o dplain - m a n a g e m e n t / f l o o d - z o n e s  ( l a s t  update d  J u l y  2 4 ,  
2 0 1 4 ).  
49  C O N G . B U D G E T  O F F I C E ,  P U B . N O . 4 0 0 8 ,  T H E  N A T I O N A L  F L O O D  I N S U R A N C E  
P R O G R A M :  F A C T O R S  A F F E C T I N G  A C T U A R I A L  S O U N D N E S S  1 4  ( ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp://w w w.cb o.go v / s i t e s / d e f a u l t / f i l e s / c b o f i l e s / f tpdoc s / 1 0 6 x x / d o c 1 0 6 2 0 / 1 1 - 0 4 -
f l o o d i n s u r a n c e.pdf ; s e e  a l s o  T h e o d o r i c  M e y e r ,  U s i n g  O utdated  D ata, F E M A  i s  
W r o n g l y  P l a c i n g  H o m e o w n e r s  i n  F l o o d  Z o n e s ,  P R O P U B L I C A  ( J u l y  1 8 ,  2 0 1 3 ,  1 2 : 0 7  
P M )  h t tp://w w w.propubli c a.or g / a r t i c l e / u s i n g - o u t d a t e d - d a t a - f e m a - i s - w r o n g l y -
plac i n g - h o m e o w n e r s - i n - f l o o d - z o n e s .  C h a n g e s  m a d e  b y  B i g g e r t - W a t e r s  w e r e  
s uppose d  t o  i mprov e  t h e  updati n g  proc e s s. I d .; S c o t t  G a b r i e l  K n o w l e s ,  B i g g e rt -
W aters  a n d  N F I P :  F l o o d  I n s u r a n c e  S h o u l d  B e  Stre n gthe n e d ,  S l a t e  ( M a r c h  2 3 ,  
2 0 1 4 ,  1 1 : 4 7  P M ) ,  
h t tp://w w w.sla t e.co m / a r t i c l e s / h e a l t h _ a n d _ s c i e n c e / s c i e n c e / 2 0 1 4 / 0 3 / b i g g e r t _ w a t e r s _
a n d _ n f ip_flo o d _ i n s u r a n c e _ s h o u l d _ b e _ s t r e n g t h e n e d.htm l.  
50  R A W L E  O.  K I N G ,  C O N G . R E S E A R C H  S E R V .,  R 4 2 8 5 0 ,  T H E  N A T I O N A L  F L O O D  
I N S U R A N C E  P R O G R A M :  S T A T U S  A N D  R E M A I N I N G  I S S U E S  F O R  C O N G R E S S  1 9 – 2 0  
( 2 0 1 3 ).  
51  S e e  B i l l  D e d m a n ,  F B I  I n v e stig a tes F E M A  F l o o d  M a p  C h a n g e s  A fter  N B C  N e w s  
R e p o rt ,  N B C  N E W S  ( M a r. 2 7 ,  2 0 1 4 ) ,  
h t tp://w w w.nb c n e w s.co m / n e w s / i n v e s t i g a t i o n s / f b i - i n v e s t i g a t e s - f e m a - f l o o d - m ap -
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example, BW w as  going to phase out the s ubs idies  entirely f or certain 
“ repetitive los s  properties,”  s econd  homes , bus ines s  properties, homes  
that have been s ubs tantially improved or damaged, and homes  s old to 
new  ow ners.  BW permit ted  much f as ter N F IP  annual rate increas es  (25  
percent annually, up from previous 10  percent cap) , and require d  all 
premiums to be bas ed on “ average his torical los s  years ,” including 
catas trophic loss  years.  One of  the mos t controvers ial aspects of  the new  
la w  w as  the elimination of  grandf athering f or the many older buildings  
in high - ris k areas.   
However, the backlas h  f rom property owners  along coas tal areas , 
w here res ulting premium increas es  w ere the  greates t, w as  s w if t and 
ef f ective .53  In s ome areas , there w ere reports of  homeow ners ’  premiums 
ris ing ten f old. 54   The concern expressed by many law makers , on behalf  
of  their angry cons tituents , w as  that unles s  BW w as  repealed or at leas t 
delayed, they w ouldn’t be able to remain in their homes  or continue their 
s mall bus ines s es.  Thus, bef ore BW w as  able to take ef f e ct , Congres s  
passed in 2014 the H omeow ner F lood Ins urance A f f ordability A ct  
(H F IA A ) 5 5 , w hich s ignif icantly w eakened the changes  made by BW. The 
political pressure to repeal BW w as  s o s ucces s f ul that even 
Representative M axine Waters  voted in s upport of repe aling her ow n 
b ill. As a res ult , the 2014 A c t  imposed tighter  limits on yearly premium 
increas e s , reins tate d  the N F IP  grandf athering provision , and preserved 
the dis counted premiums f or  s old properties.  The new  law  als o call ed  on 
F EM A  to keep premiums at no more than 1 percent  of  the value of  the 
coverage.  
 
2 . Flor ida’s  Citizens Pr operty Insurance Cor por ation  
The other example of large - s c a l e  government - s old ins urance f or 
w eather ris k is  F lorida’s  Citizens  P roperty I ns urance  Corporation  
(Citizens ) — a s tate ow ned company that specializes  in w ind - damage (and 
other, multiple - peril) coverage f or homeow ners  and bus ines s es  in 
F lorida.   Wind  damage , of  cours e, is  the larges t element of  w eather  ris k  
covered by thes e policies, s ince f lood  damage , the other maj or w eather  
peril , is  already  covered almos t exclus ively by the N F IP . Indeed, 
Citizens  provides the vas t maj ority of  the w ind ins urance f or properties 
on the coas t of  F lorida; and in many high - ris k coas tal areas , Citizens  is  
the only ins urer  in F lorida  o f f ering w ind policies.  The company collects  
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premiums that are us ed to pay the los s es  covered under the policies , but, 
as  w ith the N F IP , the premiums are f ar below  w hat is  neces s ary to cover 
the f ull ris k. 56  
At f irs t glance,  Citizens  appears to price  its wi nd coverage in the 
s ame w ay private ins urers  do.  Citizens  begin s  by evaluating  the ris k of  
w ind damage in particular areas.  The areas  co ns is t of  1 50  geogr a phic 
rating territories.  Citizens  gives  e ach territory a particular rate that tak es 
into account w eather patterns , cons truction  methods , and past loss es  in 
that area . Citizens  s e t s  the  w ind rates  w ith the us e of  s ophisticated 
computer modeling techniques , inf ormed by data about hurricane 
patterns, and a dj us ted periodically bas ed on new  inf ormation and  
updated experience .  These bas e rates  are then us ed by Citizens  to 
determine the individualized premium  charged f or individual policies.  
This rating methodology is  identical to the approach  f ollow ed by 
private ins urers ,  w ith one big dif f eren ce . Citizens ’ premiums  do not  
ref lect the actuarial ris k as s ociated w ith each ins ured property .57  Several 
reas ons  help to explain the gap between true ris k and charged premiums .  
First, s tate regulations  place limits  on the extent to w hich premiums can 
be increas ed, even w hen premiums are priced below  actual ris ks.  
Second, there is  s ome cros s - s ubs idization among the 150  territories  at 
the level of  rate - s etting. 58  Third , and mos t s ignif ica ntly,  Citizens  does  
not f ace the s ame budgetary cons traints  that private ins urers  do . If it f alls  
s hort — if  the premiums collected are not enough to pay for the w ind 
damage it covers — Citizens  can invoke an “ as s es s ment” process to cover 
the s hortf all. As a r es ult,  s ome of  the catas trophic wind ris k posed by 
hurricanes  is  s hif ted f rom  Citizens ’ policyholders  to  F lorida  taxpayers . 
Under the as s es s ment process, Citizens  can s ecure emergency 
f unding f or catas trophic loss es  that exceed its ow n res erves , as  w ell as  its 
various  s ources  of  reins urance, by imposing  a tax  not only on all 
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58  S u m n e r  I n t e r v i e w.  
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Citizens ’  policyholders  but als o on all ins urance policyholders  (including 
homeow ners  and car  ow ners ,  among others ) w ithin the s tate.  Part of  this  
as s es s ment/tax is  collected up front, and part is spread out over a number 
of  years , until the def icit is  paid. 59   The net ef f ect is  that the premium s  
actually charged by Citizens  to a policyholder f or a given piece of  
property  of ten do not ref lect the f ull actuarial ris k as s ociated w ith that 
ins ured property .  Moreover, as  w e s how  in detail below , the s ubs idies  
are not allocated equally among Citizens ’ policyholders.   
 
* * *  
In s um, through a variety of  programs, the government ins ures  
w eather ris k. Some of  thes e programs rely on largely the s ame actuarial 
methodology as  us ed by private ins ur ers : coverage only f or premium -
paying policyholders , rating the ris k according to his t orical los s  and 
claims  data, and dif f erentiation of  premiums through f eature rating that 
is  s ens itive to the policyholders ’ idios yncratic ris k  and mitigation . Other 
programs provide relief  more univers ally, to all victims  of  dis as ter . 
Whether it is  through the s elling of  ins urance policies or through dis as ter 
relief , government ins urance relies  on more than the collected premium 
to f und coverage , and is  heavily s upported by taxpayers . 
We now  turn to evaluat e  the s ucces s  of  government i ns urance as  
an ex ante regulator of  w eather ris k, and compare it to the tools  utilized 
by private ins urance.  
 
III.  THE D ISTORTIONS OF G OVERNMENT W EATHER INSURANCE  
 
P art I introduce d  the bas ic ques tion w e are as king in this  article: 
What are  the tool s  avai lable to ins urers  in  regulating w eather ris k ? H ow  
does  ins urance induce  policy holders  to ins tall s af ety meas ures  and to 
choos e s af er locations  f or habitation ? We s aw  that ins urance has  the 
capacity to perform the s ame s ocial f unction as  public regulation  like 
zoning and building codes , operating bef ore s evere w eather occurs  to 
induce better preparedness . 
Insurance can be provided either by private organizations  or by 
the government. In Part II w e explained that much of  the ins urance f or 
s evere w eather ris k in the U.S is provided by the government, through a 
variety of  programs, s ome res embling the  s tructure of  private ins urance  
and others  of f ering purely ex post relief.  We als o explained that private 
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w eather ins urance markets  have declined largely becaus e of  the  
government’s  provision of  low er - priced  alternatives.  
We are now  ready to apply the conceptual framew ork of  P art I 
( how  ins urance regulates ) to the exis ting environment des cribed in P art 
II (government ins urance f or f lood and w ind). This w ill help us  answ er a 
normative ques tion: H ow  w ell does  government ins urance perform as  a 
regulator of  w eather ris k? In particular, how  does  it f are relative to the 
performance of  private ins urance?  Would it be better to outs ource the 
regulatory role of  s evere  w eather  preparedness  to private ins urance 
markets ?  
G iven the underdeveloped private market f or w eather ins urance , 
w e cannot line up the two ins titution s  neck - to - neck and compare. 
Instead, w e identif y element s  that are unique to government - provided 
ins ur ance, and evaluate their ef f ects. These ef f ects  can then be compared 
wit h  hypothetical private ins urance patterns, given w hat is  know n about 
private ins urance operation in other markets.  
The analys is  below  examine s  the government’s  ins urance 
performance  a long tw o normative metrics : f airnes s  and ef f iciency. 
Section A  examines  the dis tributive ef f ects  of  government ins urance and 
tries  to ans w er a ques tion of ten lef t unas ked: w ho are the benef iciaries  of  
the implicit subs idies  inherent in government ins urance ? Is  it a 
progressive redis tributive s cheme? S ection B examines  the productive 
ef f iciency aspects of  government ins urance: how  does  it af f ect 
inves tment incentives ?  H ow  does  it af f ect total w elf are?  
 
A. Distributive Effects  
Now, is  this a bailout for the rich  people?  
--  Representative Bill Cas s idy (R - LA) 6 0  
 
1.  Ins ur ance Cr os s - Subs idies : Who ar e the beneficiar ies ?  
P rivate ins urance covers  only premium - paying policyholders.  
That is  how  ins urance markets  w ork : ris k - avers e parties pay premiums to 
a privately  managed f und that is  contractually bound to cover certain 
specified los s es  if  they occur.  In a competitive environment , the 
premiums ins urers  collect (minus  adminis trative cos ts ) mus t roughly 
equal the amount of  the payouts.  It f ollow s  that private ins u r ance  cannot 
pay claims  of  victims  w ho have not paid into the ins urance pool.  It als o 
cannot s ys tematically undercharge s ome policyholder s , becaus e that 
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w ould require an of f s etting s ys tematic overcharge of  others. Those 
overcharged, how ever, w ould  be cherry - picked by competitors w ho can 
of f er them better terms. In private ins urance, any redis tribution occurs  
w ithin the pool of policyholders  and only ex  post — namely, f rom lucky 
non - victims  to unlucky victims. As long as  premiums are s et according 
to the ris k data, there is  no ex ante cros s - s ubs idy — no policyholder pays 
for an expected benef it that others  enj oy disproportionately.  
By contras t, becaus e government ins urance is  partially f unded by  
general tax revenues , there is  no s uch actuarial budget  con s traint. In fact, 
g overnment r elief  programs and ins urance plans are  specifically  intended 
to create s ys tematic trans f er f avoring res idents  of  dis as ter areas . And 
u nlike private ins urance, government s old ins urance can contain a  
s ys tematic and intended  dis count to make its  policies more af f ordable, 
and the def icit  can be covered  through the government’s  general budget . 
Indeed , th e unique f eature of  government ins urance  compared with 
private ins urance, and the primary reas on f or es tablis hing it, is  precisely 
the creation of  a n ex ante  cros s - s ubs idy s cheme.  
Such cros s - s ubs id ies  obvious ly conf lict w ith actuarial 
conceptions of  f airnes s — charging every person who is  covered by an 
ins urance policy a premium equal to that person’s expected benef its  
und er the policy (“ to each according to h er  benef it”). Actuarial f airnes s  
has  an intuitive appeal, for example, when dif f erences  in ris ks  are the 
res ult of  individuals ’ voluntary choices. It seems  f air that s mokers  s hould 
pay higher lif e and health ins urance premiums than non - s mokers , and 
that aggres s ive  drivers  pay higher auto ins urance premiums. 61  
The cros s - s ubs idy embodied in government ins urance  is  an 
intended f eature  despite it s  violati on of  actuarial f airnes s , becaus e it is  
thought to be f air and progressive. In the af termath of  H urricane K atrina, 
f or example, Representative Barney F rank promoted increas ed f unding 
to the N F IP  becaus e of  “ our moral duty to the poorest people and 
w orking people and low er middle income people.” 6 2  More recently , 
w hen Congres s  reins tated the s ubs idized f lood ins urance rates  in 2014  
(af ter a previous bill s ought to s cale dow n the s ubs idies ) , the bill w a s  
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pitched as  a program f avoring s truggling homeow ners.  It  garnered 
bipartisan s upp ort (approved with a vote of  72 - 22 in the S enate) becaus e 
cuts  in s ubs idies  “ burdened low er -  and middle - clas s  homeow ners  and 
s mall bus ines s es .” 6 3  As the H ous e voted dow n an amendment to the bill 
that w ould have removed retroactive reimburs ements  of  high pre miums 
to the ow ners  of  coas tal vacation homes , 6 4  representatives  invoked 
progressive s entiments  by alluding to anecdotal s tories  of  the s uf f ering of  
low er - clas s , middle - clas s , and s enior citizens  as  a res ult of  the previously 
enacted premium hikes. The subs idies , one Congres s man s aid, w ill 
prevent w orking f amilies , w ho are “ doing everything they can to put 
food on the table,” f rom los ing their homes. 65  As one of  the Bill’s  
champions explained,  
“ This  is  not about the millionaires  in mans ions  on the 
beach.  . . These are middle clas s , w orking people 
living in normal, middle clas s  hous es  doing their bes t 
to rais e their kids , contribute to their communities  and 
make a living.” 6 6  
Thes e ins urance s ubs idy s chemes  are  appealing becaus e the ris k 
dif f erences  are thought to be arbitrary, not the res ult of  voluntary choice. 
People suff ering high ris k  of  w eather dis as ters  are hardly at f ault, their 
los s es  are of ten devas tating , and their ins urance premium s  are f inancially 
crus hing . Thus, w hen polled, even people who are not af f ected by f lood 
ins urance premium s ubs idies  (but w ho, perhaps unbeknow ns t to them, 
pay taxes  to f und them ) s trongly s upport the s ubs idies. In one s urvey, 
only 15% of  unaf f ected F lorida citizens  s upported the pre mium 
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prof i t s.”) ;  I d .  a t  H 1 6 0 1  ( d a i l y  e d. F e b. 5 ,  2 0 1 4 )  ( s t a t e m e n t  o f  R ep. K il m e r )  
( c l a i m i n g  t h a t  t h e  prem i u m  i n c r e a s e s  h a v e  a l r e a d y  h u r t  h i s  d i s t r i c t  “ s t r u g g l [ i n g ]  
w i t h  d o u b l e - d i g i t  u n e mploy m e n t ” ).  
6 4  I d . at S 1 6 2 7  ( d a i l y  e d. M a r. 1 3 ,  2 0 1 4 )  ( s t a t e m e n t  o f  S e n. L e e ).  
6 5  S e e ,  e . g . ,  I d .  a t  S 5 8 1  ( d a i l y  e d. J a n. 2 9 ,  2 0 1 4 )  ( S t a t e m e n t  o f  S e n. H e i t k a mp).  
66  I d .  a t  S 1 6 3 1  ( d a i l y  e d. M a r. 1 3 ,  2 0 1 4 )  ( s t a t e m e n t  o f  S e n. L a n d r i e u ).  
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increas es. 67  The af f ordability concern , bols tered by a s trong intuition that 
the benef iciaries  of  the s ubs idies  are low er - middle income f amilies , 
trumps the amorphous conception of  actuarial f airnes s  as  a w ay to 
achieve dis tributive j us tice.  
The cros s - s ubs idy created  by government - s old ins urance f ollow s , 
then, a dis tinct logic: it moves  f rom people lucky enough to live in s af e 
areas  (“ the af f luent”)  to the les s  lucky res idents  living in low  lying areas  
in s torms ’ paths  (“the poor ”) . But t his  conj ecture , that s ubs idized f lood 
ins urance benef its  the les s  af f luent, has  not been tes ted. We believe that 
it is  w rong  and that the opposite is true : the s ubs idy accrues  primarily to 
the af f luent . This  f or a s imple reason: thos e w ho need f lood ins urance 
mos t are the  habitants  of  properties build in proximity to the coas t , w here 
s evere w eather s trikes  mos t f orcef ully. Becaus e properties adj acent to the 
coas t are in general  ( putting w eather ris k to one s ide)  more des irable and 
more expensive, the benef iciaries  of  th e s ubs idies  are not the poor but 
the af f luent .68  
If in f act  the high - ris k beachf ront ow ners  are, all els e equal, 
w ealthier, they are  les s  des erving of  means - bas ed  government s ubs id ies . 
Moreover, any f orm of  government - s ubs idized ins urance — dis as ter relief  
or contractual policies — is  f unded through general tax revenues ,  6 9  
coming f rom middle income taxpayers living mos tly  inland in low er -
valued homes  (or, as  w e s aw , f rom as s es s ments  on drivers  buying auto 
ins urance) . To the extent that high - income ow ners  of  b eachf ront property 
are the primary benef iciaries  of  this  government ins urance s cheme,  and 
to the extent that the cros s - s ubs idy is  disproportionately f unded by the  
les s  af f luent inland - res iding taxpayers  and policyholders ,  w e  argue  that it 
represents a regr es s ive f orm of  redis tribution . And, as  a matter of  public 
choice , the more the government has  to bail out its  under - capitalized 
ins urance f und, the les s  tax revenue remains  to spend on other, more 
progressive programs.  
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67  J e f f  H a r r i n g t o n ,  P o l l :  O p p o s itio n  to F l o o d  I n s u r a n c e  R ate H i k e s  i s  Stro n g ,  
T A M P A  B A Y  T I M E S ,  D e c  2 4 ,  2 0 1 3 ,  
h t tp://w w w.ta mpab a y.co m / n e w s / b u s i n e s s / b a n k i n g /poll - opposit i o n - t o - f l o o d -
i n s u r a n c e - r a t e - h i k e s - i s - s t r o n g / 2 1 5 8 5 0 8.  
68  C O N G . B U D G E T  O F F I C E ,  P U B . N O . 2 8 0 7 ,  V A L U E  O F  P R O P E R T I E S  I N  T H E  
N A T I O N A L  F L O O D  I N S U R A N C E  P R O G R A M  ( 2 0 0 7 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp://w w w.cb o.go v / s i t e s / d e f a u l t / f i l e s / c b o f i l e s / f tpdoc s / 8 2 x x / d o c 8 2 5 6 / 0 6 - 2 5 -
f l o o d i n s u r a n c e.pdf [ h e r e i n a f t e r  C B O ,  V A L U E  O F  P R O P E R T I E S ].  
69  S e e ,  e . g . ,  L e t t e r  f r o m  J a n e t  N apolit a n o ,  S e c ’ y  o f  D ep’t o f  H o m e l a n d  S e c u r i t y ,  t o  
R ep. B a r n e y  F r a n k  ( Apr. 2 4 ,  2 0 0 9 )  ( “ T h e  [ O b a m a ]  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i s  a s k i n g  f o r  
d e b t  f o r g i v e n e s s  b e c a u s e  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  d e b t  c r e a t e s  a n  u n s t a b l e  f i n a n c i a l  
s i t u a t i o n  f o r  t h e  N F I P  a n d  t h e  s u b s i d i z e d  i n s u r a n c e  prem i u m  s t r u c t u r e  d o e s  n o t  a n d  
w i l l  n o t  a l l o w  t h e  N F I P  t o  c o l l e c t  e n o u g h  t o  s e r v i c e  t h e  d e b t  o r  r epay i t.”).  
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We w is h to tes t our  regres s ive redis tribution hypothesis, and w e 
do s o in tw o w ays. First, w e examine the dis tribution of  s ubs idies  under 
F lorida’s  Citizens  ins urance. We begin w ith this  s cheme becaus e w e 
have data about actual prices and s ubs idies , w hich allow s  us  to meas ur e 
d irectly the direction of  the redis tribution. Second, w e return to the N F IP  
and point to  s ome indirect evidence regarding  the direction  of  
redis tribution. Together, thes e obs ervations  s ugges t that government 
w eather ins urance has  unappreciated but s ubs ta ntial regres s ive ef f ects . 
 
2.  Redistribution under  Flor ida’s  Citizens Pr operty Insurance  
 
T he state subsidiz ed the well - to - do who live near  
the beach at the expens e of the less - well - to - do 
who don’t.  
 —  M ichael Lew is , N ew  Y ork Times 7 0  
 
a.  Citizen s ’  data and s ome initial obs ervations  
Citizens  w ind - peril ins urance policies are s old to homeow ners  in 
every part of F lorida. The policies are priced according to the w ind 
territory in w hich the ins ured property is located. There are 150 s uch 
territories. Prices  are adj us t ed annually and have to be approved by the 
s tate O f f ice of  Ins urance Regulation. Statutory and regulatory caps limit 
the extent to w hich Citizens  can rais e its  rates  in any given year.  
As dis cus s ed above, Citizens ’ actual ins urance premiums are 
know n — and intended to be — dif f erent than the “ true ris k” premiums 
(thos e representing an actuarially accurate methodology). For every 
calendar year, Citizens  publishes  charts  lis ting, f or each individual 
policy, the actual premium and the true ris k hypothetical premi um, 
allo w ing a s traight f orw ard calculation of  the s ubs idy each policy 
receives  ( i n 2012, there w ere 527,250 individual policies) . This is  the 
“policy level data.” In addition, b ecaus e policies are rated and priced 
bas ed on their ris k territory, and becaus e  all policies w ithin a given 
territory enj o y the s ame proportional s ubs idy, s ome of  the inf ormation 
can be analyzed by comparing patterns acros s  territories. For that, w e 
us ed aggregated “ territory level data.” 7 1   
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70  M i c h a e l  L e w i s ,  I n  N atur e ’ s  C a s i n o ,  N.Y.  T IM E S  M A G A Z I N E ,  A u g. 2 6 ,  2 0 0 7 ,  a t  
5 1 ,  a v a i l a b l e  at   
h t tp://w w w.ny t i m e s.co m / 2 0 0 7 / 0 8 / 2 6 / m a g a z i n e / 2 6 n e w o r l e a n s - t.htm l.  
7 1  T h e  d a t a  o n  w h i c h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c h a r t s  a n d  s t a t i s t i c s  a r e  b a s e d  w e r e  s upplie d  t o  
t h e  a u t h o r s  b y  C i t i z e n s  P r operty  I n s u r a n c e  C o mpany  i n  r e spons e  t o  a  publi c  d a t a  
r e q u e s t.  T h e  d a t a ,  w h i c h  w e r e  c o mpile d  b y  C i t i z e n s  f o r  t h e  purpose  o f  i t s  
S eptem b e r  3 0 ,  2 0 1 2 ,  r a t e - f i l i n g  w i t h  t h e  F l o r i d a  O f f i c e  o f  I n s u r a n c e  R e g u l a t i o n  
( specif i c a l l y ,  f r o m  F l o r i d a  O f f i c e  o f  I n s u r a n c e  R e g u l a t i o n  f i l i n g  n u m b e r  1 3 - 1 3 0 4 8 ) ,  
! #%+#!
To get a general s ens e of  the s ubs idy picture, w e looked initially 
at the territory data. Here, in publicly available rate f ilings , Citizens  
publishes  s ummaries  f o r  each of  the 150 ris k territories , s how ing the 
total s um of  premiums paid by policyholders  i n that territory, as well as  
the “ indicated” rate change , that is , how  much more (or les s ) it ought to 
charge policyholders  in that territory to break even  actuarially . Here is  an 
example: 7 2  
 
Territory N ame  Wind P remium  Indicated Rate 
Change  
M onroe  $38,582 ,378  126.5%  
Hills borough, Exc. Tampa  $19,496,173  25.9%  
Pinellas  –  S aint P eters burg  $29,059,878  14.7%  
Brow ard (Excl. Hllwd & F t. 
Ldrdle)  
$70,297,604  - 12.5%  
Brow ard  (Wind 47)  $27,847,251  57.3%  
Brow ard  (Wind 48)  $21,530,419  17.3%  
 
In M onroe territory, f or example, where s ome of  the s outh 
F lorida keys  are located, the premiums actually collected by Citizens  
total $38,582,378, but they f all s hort of  Citizen s ’ es timate of  the 
expected ris k, and an increas e of  126.5% in the premium char ged to each 
policy in that territory w ould be neces s ary to cover this  s hortf all. In 
Tampa’s suburbs  or in S aint P eters burg, the s hortf all in premiums is  
more modes t, 25.9% and 14.7%, respectively. Many  of  the highly 
populated F lorida areas , s uch as  Brow ard  County w here  F t. Lauderdale 
is  located,  are divided into s everal ris k territories. As the chart above 
s how s , s ome of  thes e territories , like the one labeled Wind 47, receive a 
s ubs tantial s ubs idy (57.3% above the actual cos t); others , like Wind 48, 
receiv e a modes t s ubs idy (17.3%); and s ome are actually overcharged 
and receive a negative s ubs idy. 73  
Since there are 150 territories  and they vary greatly by the 
amount of  s ubs id ies  they receive, w e w anted to s ee if  any pattern might  
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i n c l u d e  a  r a n g e  o f  f a c t s  a b o u t  e v e r y  h o m e o w n e r s ’  polic y  o f  a  parti c u l a r  s o r t  ( H O 3  
polic i e s  c o v e r i n g  w i n d  r i s k )  i s s u e d  b y  C i t i z e n s  i n  t h e  r e l e v a n t  perio d.  T h e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  e a c h  polic y  i n c l u d e s  t h e  prem i u m  a c t u a l l y  c h a r g e d  f o r  t h e  polic y ,  
t h e  “ i n d i c a t e d  prem i u m ”  f o r  t h e  polic y ,  t h e  l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n s u r e d  property  b y  z ip 
co d e ,  a n d  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  c o v e r a g e ,  a m o n g  o t h e r  t h i n g s.  W e  w i l l  c i t e  t h e s e  d a t a  
g e n e r a l l y  a s  “ C i t i z e n s  2 0 1 2  W i n d  R i s k  D a t a.” C opies  o f  t h e  d a t a  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  w i t h  
t h e  a u t h o r s  a n d  c a n  b e  s e c u r e d  s epara t e l y  f r o m  C i t i z e n s  t h r o u g h  a  publi c  d a t a  
r e q u e s t.  
72  C i t i z e n s  2 0 1 2  W i n d  R i s k  D a t a ,  s u p r a  n o t e  7 1 . 
73  I d .  
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be dis cerned. To that end , w e created a map of Florida by ris k territories  
and colored each territory according to the magnitude of  the s ubs idy it 
receives. The darker the s hade  of  green , the higher  the s ubs idy  
represented on the map :  
Figure 3 Here  
F igure 3  s how s  a remarkable, but perhaps predictable, pattern. 
Coastal territories , almos t w ithout exception, enj oy large percentage 
s ubs idies , w hereas  inland territories  receive s maller s ubs idies , if  they 
receive any s ubs idy at all.  As similar relations hip can be s een  w hen w e 
zoom in an d look at dens ely populated S outh F lorida:  
Figure 4 Here  
The pattern is  even clearer here : the s ubs idies  are larger in 
territories  very clos e to  the w a t e r . Figures  1 and 2  als o help us begin to 
conj ecture  a possible  relation betw een s ubs idy and w ealth , s ince w ater 
proximity is  of ten a f eature attracting w ealthy home buyers . 74  To 
vis ualize this , w e plotted on the s ubs idy maps the loc ation of  the highes t 
and low es t  w ealth concentrations. Red dots  mark  territor ies  in w hich the 
median home  value is  at leas t three s tandard deviations  above the 
s t a t e w ide  media n . 75  Blue dots  mark areas  more than one s tandard 
deviation  below  median home  value . No surprise: w ealthy hous eholds  
are located in the high s ubs idy (deep green) territories. Poor hous eholds  
are located more  of ten in the low -  or no - s ubs idy territories.  
These maps reflect the territory - bas ed data, comparing the 
treatment of  the 150 dif f erent ins urance ris k territories. Eventually, w e 
w ould like to test  if  the dis tribution of  s ubs idies  is  indeed correlated w ith  
the dis tribution of  w ealth. To do s o , w e needed more inf ormation about 
policyholders ’ w ealth. We used tw o s ources :  
(i) H ous ehold Value : Citizens ’ policy level data do  not include 
home values , but they do list the zip code s  of  the ins ured properties . 
Thus, w e w ere able to us e publicly available inf ormation about median 
hous ehold value w ithin the zip code in w hich the ins ured property is 
located. 76   
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74  C B O  V A L U E  O F  P R O P E R T I E S ,  s u p r a  n o t e  6 8 ,  a t  9 – 1 0  ( f i g u r e s  s h o w i n g  t h a t  h o m e s  
c l o s e  t o  w a t e r  a r e  m o r e  e xpens i v e ).  
75  W e  u s e d  f o u r  d i f f e r e n t  s i z e s  t o  i n d i c a t e  3 - 4 ,  4 - 5 ,  5 - 6 ,  a n d  6 +  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n s  
a b o v e  s t a t e w i d e  m e d i a n.  
76  S e e  A m e r i c a n  F a ctFin d e r ,  U.S.  C E N S U S  B U R E A U ,   
h t tp://f a c t f i n d e r.ce n s u s.go v / f a c e s / n a v / j s f / page s / s e a r c h r e s u l t s.xh t m l  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  J a n. 
6 ,  2 0 1 5 )  ( e n t e r i n g  “ B 2 5 0 7 7 :  M E D I A N  V A L U E  ( D O L L A R S ) ”  i n t o  t h e  “ t opic o r  
t a b l e  n a m e ”  s e a r c h  f i e l d  a n d  a n y  g i v e n  l o c a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  “ s t a t e ,  c o u n t y  o r  plac e  
( optio n a l ) ”  s e a r c h  f i e l d  w i l l  y i e l d  t h e  d e s i r e d  m e d i a n  h o u s e h o l d  v a l u e ).  
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(ii) Cover age  L i m it : Citi zens ’ policy level data include  an entry 
f or the amount of  ins urance purchased under each policy. Since 
ins urance law  does  not allow  the purchase of  coverage exceeding the 
value of  the property, we can us e the coverage amount as  a n es timate of  
the  low er bound of  the property ’s  value. This w ill help us te st w hether 
people who ow n low e r - valued homes  receive a greater or s maller 
ins urance s ubs idy. 77  
To f urther vis ualize the relation betw een s ubs idy and w ealth, w e 
us ed the zip  code level hous ehold value data. For each zip code, w e 
know  the median hous ehold value, and w e computed the average dollar 
value  s ubs idy f or all Citizens ’ policies is s ued in that zip code, taken f rom 
Citizens  policy - level data. When w e did this  f or all 904 F lorida zip 
codes, w e got the f o llow ing s catter plot:  
 
Figure 5 Here  
 
The trend line is  positive, s ugges ting that zip codes w ith higher 
valued homes  receive higher per - policy  subs idies . 
A similar picture emerges  if  w e look at policy level data and as k 
w hether high - value policies  (thos e  attached to high - value homes )  receive 
a higher or low er s ubs idy. We divided Citizens ’  policies in to f ive 
quintiles  according to the policy coverage amount. For each quintile, w e 
calculated the average s ubs idy. Again, w e s ee a clear picture: higher 
quintile s  of  w ealth get a higher abs olute  s ubs idy:   
 
Figure 6 Here  
 
b.  Empirical A nalys is  
In order to meas ure the disproportionate benef it of  the ins urance 
s ubs idy to the af f luent , w e us ed  Citizens ’ policy level data. For each 
policy, w e looked at tw o meas ure s  of  s ubs idy. First, w e looked at the 
s traightf orw ard “ abs olute s ubs idy” w hich is  the dif f erence betw een the 
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77  I n  t h e  y e a r  f r o m  w h i c h  o u r  d a t a  w e r e  t a k e n  ( 2 0 1 2 ) ,  t h e r e  w a s  n o  upper l i m i t  o n  
t h e  v a l u e  o f  properti e s  o r  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  c o v e r a g e  i n  C i t i z e n s ’  polic i e s.  I n  2 0 1 4 ,  
h o w e v e r ,  t h e  F l o r i d a  l e g i s l a t u r e  a d opted  a  l i m i t.  Specif i c a l l y ,  u n d e r  c u r r e n t  l a w ,  
C i t i z e n s  i s  o n l y  perm i t t e d  t o  prov i d e  c o v e r a g e  f o r  a  d w e l l i n g  up to  a  r eplac e m e n t  
c o s t  o f  $ 1  m i l l i o n  i n  2 0 1 4 ,  w i t h  t h i s  l i m i t  g o i n g  d o w n  b y  $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  per y e a r  e a c h  
y e a r  u n t i l  2 0 1 7 ,  w h e r e  t h e  c ap w o u l d  r e m a i n  a t  $ 7 0 0 , 0 0 0. H o w e v e r ,  i f  
polic y h o l d e r s  c a n  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  n o t  a b l e  t o  f i n d  c o v e r a g e  i n  t h e  priv a t e  
m a r k e t  f o r  polic i e s  i n  t h e  r a n g e  b e t w e e n  $ 7 0 0 , 0 0 0  a n d  $ 1  m i l l i o n ,  t h e n  t h e  $ 1  
m i l l i o n  c ap w il l  apply, r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  l o w e r  phas e d  i n  c aps in  l a t e r  y e a r s.  S e e  F L A . 
S T A T . §  6 2 7.35 1 ( 6 ) ( a ) ( 3 )  ( 2 0 1 4 ).  
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premium charged and the hypothetical premium ref lecting f ull ris k. 
Since Citizens  reports the “ indicated rate change” neces s ary to bring the 
actual premium to the f ull ris k level, this  abs olute s ubs idy f or each 
policy is  s imply the premium   charged f or that policy times  the  indicated 
rate change  f or that policy.  
But the abs olute s ubs idy may tell an incomplete story. A  $300 
s ubs idy f or a low - coverage  policy of , s ay, $50,000, may be a relatively 
more s ignif icant  f actor  than a $500 s ubs idy f or a high - coverage  policy  of  
$500,000 . We theref ore w anted to meas ure the relative s ubs idy each 
policy is  getting. To do this , w e created a s ynthetic benchmark in w h ich 
the s ubs idy pool  (the total amount of  s ubs idy f or all policies  w ithin the 
datas et ) is  divided pro rata acros s  the policies, under the (counterf actual) 
as s umption that all policies receive the s ame indicated rate change — the 
s ame percent dis count . We denoted this  benchmark  as a “ unit s ubs idy ,” 
w ith all policies receiving exactly one unit . We then compared this  unit -
s ubs idy benchmark w ith the actual percent dis count each policy 
received. This created a dis tribution of  “percent s ubs idies ,” s ome 
recei ving more than the unit benchmark , other s  receiving les s. We 
meas ured  w hether  this  “per cent s ubs idy”  dis tribution  w a s  correlated w ith 
hous ehold w e a l t h . Wealth, recall, is  meas ured in our es timates  in tw o 
dif f erent w ays : coverage limit under the policy and median zip code 
hous ehold value . 
We estimated tw o  regres s ion model s :  
 
L ogAbs oluteSubsidy i  = ! + " L ogWealth i  + # i  
 
Per cent Subsidy i  = ! + " L ogWealth i  + # i  
 
The f irs t model examines  how  increas e in w ealth correlates  w ith 
the abs olute s ubs idy. A one  percent  increas e in w ealth is  as s ociated w ith 
a "  percent  increas e in the abs olute s ubs idy. If ⇤ is  positive, there is  
positive correlation betw een w ealth and s ubs idy and the government’s  
program is  regres s ive. Table 1 presents our f indings.  
The res ults  are s tat is tically s ignif icant and demons trate a 
s ignif icant correlation betw een w ealth and s ubs idy. Column (1) in Table 
1 s how s  that a one  percent increas e in the Coverage variable is  
as s ociated w ith a 1.052  percent  increas e in the s ubs idy. Simply  put , if 
property  A is  w orth tw ice as  much as  property B, and thus  the ow ner of  
property A purchases  coverage that is  100  percent  greater than the 
coverage purchased by the ow ner of  property B , the ow ner of  A  enj oys  
on average a 105  percent  higher abs olute s ubs idy. Columns  (2) – (4) 
repeat this  tes t , and obtain the s ame res ult,  w ith f ixed ef f ects  f or policy, 
s tandard errors  clus tered by territory, and both. Column (5) us es  a 
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dif f erent independent variable to meas ure w ealth –  the average 
hous ehold value w ithin the ins ured home ’s  zip  code (“ Log H H  V alue”). 
The wealth coef f icient is  s maller, 0.484  percent  (predictably, given the 
us e of  average w ealth meas ures ). 78   
The s econd model examines  the relation betw een w ealth and our 
generated s ynthetic variable of  “percent s ubs idy.” The r es ults  are 
presented in table 2.  
Again, the s ubs idy is  s trongly correlated w ith w ealth. A one  
percent increas e in hous ehold value is  as s ociated w ith either a 0.847  
percent  or 0.571  percent  increas e in percent s ubs idy, depending on how  
w e meas ure w ealth, and the res ults  are again highly s ignif icant.  
c.  D is cus s ion  
The res ult s  reported above s how  that the w ind ins urance 
s ubs idies  w ithin policies s old by Citizens  P roperty Ins urance Company 
accrue disproportionately to af f luent hous eholds , and the magnitude  of  
this  regres s ive redis tribution is  s ubs tantial. While w e are unable to 
meas ure directly the w ealth of  policyholders , w e s how ed that people 
who buy higher coverage (namely , w ho ow n more expensiv e homes ), or, 
alternatively, people who live in w ealthier  zip codes ,  receive larger 
s ubs idies , both in abs olute magnitude and as  a percent of  their premium.  
The es timates  w e derived f or the correlation betw een w ealth and 
s ubs idy probably unders tate the tru e magnitude of  the pro - affluent 
advantage . First, one of  our meas ures  of  w ealth — policy coverage 
limit — is  capped by Citizens ’ rules , w hich means  that w e are not 
meas uring the true w ealth of  the p eople who buy maximal coverage, and 
are theref ore deriving dow nw ard - bias ed correlations. Second, Citizens ’ 
report of the s ubs id ies — the indicated rate changes — u nders tates  the 
s ubs idies ’  true magnitude . Citizens  does  not take into account s ome of  
the cos ts  of  providing ins urance — cos ts  that private ins urers  w ould incur  
in  running an ins urance s cheme. Specifically, w hen Citizens  calculates  
the amount of  the indicated rate change, it does  not build into it the  cos t 
of  reins urance — an ins urance res erve  neces s ary to protect it agains t the 
ris k of  pricing errors  or unexpected  spikes in los s es.  Citizens  does  not 
need require s uch a res erve, becaus e of  its  power in ef f ect to tax the 
citizenry or to as s es s  all ins urance purchas e rs  in the s tate of  F lorida.   
We have not tried to identif y the caus al s tory underlying this  
correlati on , nor are w e interes ted in its  direction . Causation may go 
either w ay: greater w ealth may help people secure greater s ubs idies ; or 
greater s ubs idies  may help people move into more expensive homes. We 
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are not interes ted in caus ation becaus e the troubling f eature of  the s ys tem 
has  nothing to do w ith any caus al theory. The problem  is the large 
positive cor r elation  betw een w ealth and s ubs idy, a correlation that 
conf licts  w ith the goals  and underlying rhetoric j us tif ying the program.  
 
3.  Redistribution under  the NFIP  
A s  w e s aw  in P art II, the N F IP  ins ures  over 5 million properties, 
up to $350,000 per residential property. The program is  not des igned to 
be f inancially balanced. In fact, s ubs idized rates  w ere thought by 
law makers  to be an inducement f or communities  to participate in the 
program and adopt flood mitigation requirement s  f or buildings  and 
f loodplains management.  
Although in mos t years  the N F IP  collects  enough premiums to 
cover each year’s  claims , a f ew  catas trophic events  more than w ipe out 
the N F IP ’s  re s erves. Currently, in 2014, the N F IP ’s  debt exceeds  $24 
billion. Present rate s etting practices  are “ unlikely to be able to cover the 
program’s  claims , expenses, and debt, exposing the f ederal government 
and ultimately taxpayers to ever - greater f inancial ris ks , especially in 
years  of  catas trophic flooding.” 7 9  
As a res ult of  the dis counts , people insured by the N F IP  pay only 
a f raction of  the f ull - ris k premium. In 2006, F EM A  es timated this  
f raction to be 35 – 40 percent. The subs idy is , on average, clos e to two -
thirds  of  the economic cos t. An average premium charged by the N F IP  
w as  $721, but w ould cos t betw een $1800 – $2060 if  priced to cover f ull 
ris k. 80  In the highes t f lood ris k areas , the f raction of  f ull ris k paid by 
policyholders  is  even low er. 81  
A 2007 repo rt by the Congres s ional Budget O f f ice (CBO ) f ound 
that “properties covered under the N F IP  tend to be more valuable than 
other properties nationw ide.” At the time, the median value of  a home in 
the U.S. was $160,000; the median value es timated f or homes  ins ured by 
the N F IP  ranged f rom $220,000 to $400,000. The CBO  f ound that 
“ much of  the dif f erence is  attributable to the higher property values  in 
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area that are clos e to w ater.” 8 2  There are 130 million homes  in the U.S, 
but only a s mall f raction of  them receive  s ubs idized N F IP  policies. Of 
thos e w ho do, nearly 80 percent are located in counties  that rank in the 
w ealthies t quintile. 83  
Despite the image — of ten invoked in political debates  over f lood 
ins urance 8 4 — of  the s ubs idy going to s truggling middle - class 
homeow ne rs  w ho have lived f or generations  in f loodplains, the reality is  
dif f erent. “40 percent of  the s ubs idized coas t properties in the s ample are 
w orth more than $500,000; 12 percent are w orth more than $1 
million.” 8 5  Thes e are f ar higher proportions than in the  res t of  the 
country. For inland properties  (the great maj ority of  w hich do not 
purchase f lood ins urance)  only 15 percent are w orth more than $500,00 
and only 3 percent more than $1million.  
The myth of  the s ubs idized s truggling  homeow ner is  f urther 
dispel led by another s triking f act : 23 percent of  s ubs idized coas tal 
properties are not the policyholders ’ principal residence — they are either 
vacation homes  or year - round rentals. Indeed, thes e s ubs idized s econd 
homes  in coas tal areas  are generally higher in va lue than the s ubs idized 
principal residences  in the s ame coas tal areas  ($634,000 vers us  
$530,000). 86  Thus , even among the group of benef iciaries  w ho live along 
the coas t and w ho disproportionately enj oy the s ubs idy, s econd - homers  
are the bigger gainers  f rom  the s ubs idy. 47 percent of  the s ubs idized 
homes  that are not principal residences  are w orth more than $500,000 
(and 15 percent w orth more than $1 million). 87  
Another indication that w ealthier hous eholds  enj oy the N F IP  
s ubs idy is  the f raction of  homes  that purchase the maximum coverage. 
Low - value homes  ow ned by low er income res idents  do not need (and are 
ineligible f or) the maximum coverage; high - value homes  do. In 2002, 
only 11 percent of  N F IP  policies w ere at maximum limit. By 2012, the 
f raction increas ed to 42 percent, w ith mos t of  thes e high - coverage homes  
located in the G ulf  Coas t and Eas tern Coas t s tates. For example, in N e w  
Y ork (w ith a median home value of  $285,300) ,  65 percent of  its  
policyholders  had  the maximum coverage. In contras t, in West V irginia 
(a median home value of  $99,300) , only 7 percent of  its  policyholders  
had  maximum coverage. 88  
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F inally, the benef it to coas tal areas , w hich tend to have higher 
property value, accrues  in another les s  direct w ay. Participation in the 
N F IP  requires  co mmunities  to develop floodplain management plans. 
Such inves tment s  reduce f l o od ris k and increas e the land available f or 
new  cons truction. In ef f ect, the “ N F IP , by s erving as  a backs top for thos e 
ris ks , f avors  development in communities  w ith f loodplains, b y s hif ting 
s ome of  thos e ris ks  onto taxpayers.” 8 9  
 
B.  Investment Distortions  
 
In S ection A  w e as ked w hether government ins urance produces 
the des irable dis tributive ef f ects  aspired by its  political proponents, of  
improving af f ordability among low er income res i dents  of  f loodplains. 
We saw  that the opposite is true — that the benef its  of  the program f low  
disproportionately to the af f luent. We now  turn to examine another 
troubling dis tortion of  the exi s ting government ins urance programs: the  
ef f ect on total w elf are.  
 
1.  Regulation of L ocation  
In choos ing the location of  development (and redevelopment), 
people have to es timate the perils of  particular s ites. Coastal areas  are 
attractive f or many s alient reas ons , w hich f eature prominently in buyers ’ 
calculations. The dow n s ide — exposure to s evere s torms — is  recognized 
in the abs tract, but hard to quantif y.  
Insurance, if  priced accurately, provides an important s ervice of  
quantif ying the ris k  and helping people  trade it of f  agains t the upsides. 
This is  a general (des irable) f eature of  ins urance, operating in ef f ect like 
a P igouvian tax in internalizing an otherw is e overlooked cos t. 90  Know ing 
the expected cos t of  exposure to w eather dis as ter, people are more likely 
to make an inf ormed cos t - benef it calculation in choos ing locatio ns . 
Subsidized ins urance rates  des troy the inf ormation value of  f ull - ris k 
premiums, thus  s uppressing  the true cos t of  living in  s evere w eather 
zones , and creating an exces s ive incentive to populate attractive but 
dangerous  locations.  It is a moral hazard p roblem occurring at the 
dimens ion of  the activity level.  
We saw  that the N F IP  charges  s ubs idized premiums deliber ately  
to make ins urance af f ordable. 91  This  intent w as  punctuated by the  
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enactment of  the s o - called H omeow ner F lood Ins urance A f f ordability 
A c t  of  2014 , w hich s caled back premium increas es  that intended  to 
eliminate the s ubs idies . But there are additional, unintentional caus e s  f or 
the inaccurate premiums s et by the N F IP.  F irs t, the data it relies  on in 
draw ing f lood m aps is outdated.   Despite the  ef f orts  to update  and 
modernize  the maps, the long lapses betw een s uch adj us tments  are 
indicative of  the inadequate political or f inancial incentive s  to run an 
actuarially accurate s ys tem. For example, Hurricane S andy exposed the 
inadequacy of  F EM A ’s  old f lood maps and led to an updating of  high -
ris k area s . Under the new  maps, “a $429 annual premium on a s tructure 
previously outs ide the high - ris k zone could w ell ris e to $5000 to $10,000 
f or the s ame amount of  coverage if  it is  ins ide the high - ris k area.” 9 2   
Second , the  N F IP  charges  s ubs idized premiums becaus e it allow s  
certain properties to maintain  their previous his torically low  rates , 
despite data s how ing a great er  ris k. FEMA does  not even collect data on 
thes e grandf athered properties  to m eas ure their f i nancial impact on the 
program and does  not even keep track of  how  many of  thes e properties 
there are . Further, the agency s ets  f lood ins urance rates  on a nationw ide 
bas is  us ing rough averages , w hich means  that many f actors  relevant to 
f lood ris k are not sp ecifically accounted f or in rating  individual 
properties.  Normally s uch crude averaging w ould lead to advers e 
s election and unraveling ,  as  low - ris k properties  s hould prefer to  exit  and 
j oin s eparate pools with actuarially f air policies ,  rather than s ubs idize 
other neighborhoods. B ut if  the  government  s ubs idy is  deep  enough , it 
can  of f s et this  ef f ect. Finally , a s  a government report conceded, 
“ F EM A ’s  rate - s etting process als o does  not f ully take into account 
ongoing and planned development, long - term trends  in eros ion, or the 
ef f ects  of  global climate change, although private s ector models  are 
incorporating s ome of  thes e f actors. ” 9 3  
Underpricing of  f lood ins urance in coas tal  areas  has  long been 
as s ociated w ith (and likely  contributed to) exces s ive priva te development 
of  f lood zones. As the s a m e  Congres s ional report concluded, “ F EM A  . . . 
is unable, through its  rate - s etting process, to inf orm policyholders  of  the 
ris k to their property from eros ion. Consequently, in s ome cas es  f lood 
ins urance rates  may s e nd a f als e s ignal that unders tates  the ris k exposure 
f aced by current policyholders  or prospective development.” 9 4  And in 
w riting about F lorida’s  Citizens  w ind  ins urance s cheme, w riter M ichael  
Lew is  explains that F lorida “ s old its  citizens  catas trophe insurance at 
roughly one - s ixth the market rates , thus  encouraging them to live in 
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ris kier places than they w ould if  they had to pay what the mar ket 
charged .” 9 5  
Whether climate change is  indeed caus ing a more s evere pattern 
of  catas trophic storm s  may s till be debated. 96  It is  clear that the cos ts  of  
hurricanes , f or example, ha ve  increas ed dramat ically over the past 
generation . But s trikingly, much of  the upward  trend in s torm los s  data, 
af ter caref ul adj us tment f or s ocietal f actors , can be explained not by 
w eather f luctuations  but rather by increas ed concentration of  property in 
dangerous  areas , namely — by  human decis ions  to locate more dens ely  in 
the s torms ’ paths.  “The maj or caus e of  trends  in los s es  related to 
w eather and climate extremes  is  s ocietal f actors : the grow th of  w ealth 
w ith more valuable property at ris k, increas ing dens ity of  property, and 
demographic shif ts  to coas tal areas  and s torm - prone areas  that are 
experiencing increas ing urbanization.” 9 7   
Indeed,  according to the U.S. Census Bureau  the number of  
people living in coas tal areas  in F lorida increas ed by ten million people, 
almos t four fold , betw een 1960 and 2008. Coastal exposur e now  
represents 79 percent of  all property exposure in F lorida, w ith an ins ured 
value of  $2.8 trillion (in 2012). 98  Major hurricanes  did nothing to s top 
this migration. It is es timated that s ince H urricane A ndrew  s truck the 
F lorida coas t in 1992, developme nt more than doubled the property 
value on its  path. The $25 billion in total economic los s es  in 1992 
“ w ould have res ulted in more than tw ice that amount — $55 billion —
w ere it to have occurred in 2005, given current as s et values ” (even 
holding cons tant the v alue of  building material, real es tate, and other 
s ocietal changes ) .99  
The ef f ects  of  climate change on w eather patterns  are only 
beginning to be unders tood ,  but  private ins urers  are rus hing to take thes e  
emerging patterns into account,  adj us ting premium s  in light of  near 
f uture projections , and s tudying potential indus try - w ide impacts and 
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s trategies  to proactively addres s  the ris ing ris k. 10 0  FEM A , on the other 
hand,  “ has  done little to develop the kind of  inf ormation needed to 
unders tand the long - term expos ure of  N F IP  to climate change f or a 
variety of  reas ons. NFIP’s  ris k management processes  adapt to near - term 
changes  in w eather as  they af f ect exis ting data. As a res ult, N F IP  is  
des igned to as s es s  and ins ure agains t current — not f uture — ris ks  and 
currently d oes  not have the inf ormation neces s ary to adj us t rates  f or the 
potential impacts of  events  as s ociated w ith climate.” 1 0 1  If , indeed, 
climate change poses increas ed ris k s  of  f lood and eros ion to low  lying 
coas tal zones , the f ailure of  government ins urance to p rice the ris k into 
presen t policies exacerbates  the over development problem.   
A n independent report of eros ion rates  and their f inancial impact 
found that over the next s ixty years , eros ion may claim one out of  f our 
hous es  w ithin 500 f eet of  the U.S. shore line, as  the f ollow ing picture 
illus trates : 1 0 2  
 
Figure 7 Here  
 
H ow ever, t he N F IP  does  not map erosion hazard and does  not 
incorporate it into the ins urance rate. As a res ult, rates  are s et at  
approximately  half  of  actuarially accurate rates.  “Despite facing  higher 
ris k, homeow ners  in eros ion - prone areas  currently are paying the s ame 
amount f or f lood ins urance as  are policyholders  in non - eroding areas .” 1 0 3  
Not only w ill eros ion claims  have to be s ubs idized, but present ins urance 
rates  are als o “ mis leading to us ers ” becaus e they do not inf orm  
homeow ners  of  the eros ion ris k . As a res ult, the report finds  that 
development in eros ion areas  is  exces s ive. “In the abs ence of  ins urance 
and other programs to reduce f lood ris k, development dens ity w ould be 
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about 25 percen t low er in the highes t - ris k zones  than in areas  les s  
s us ceptible to damage f rom coas tal f looding.” 1 0 4  
The ef f ect of  the government ins urance s ubs idy on homeow ners ’  
location decis ion s  can be  f urther  captured by the f ollow ing f inding. In 
some of  the areas  clos es t to the s horeline, annual rates  have to be s et at  a 
w hopping $11.40 per $100 of  coverage to meet the ris k projections —
over 10 percent of  property value each year! A t the s ame time, a  s urvey 
of  homeow ners  f ound that participation in ins uran ce s cheme s  w ith s uch 
high premiums w ould be “ quite low ” —  about half  of  f lood policyholders  
are only w illing to pay up to $1 – $2/year per $100 of  coverage .10 5  
Not s urprisingly, given the s ubs tantial s ubs idy provided by N F IP  
ins urance and the increas ed developm ent along coas tal areas , the number 
of  policies is s ued by the N F IP  increas ed in the past generation f rom 1.9 
million to over 4.6 million. 10 6  Some of  thes e policyholders  have lived in 
the area long bef ore  the N F IP . But many are new comers , representing a 
repop ulation enterprise facilitated by dis torted ins urance contracts. Many 
of  thes e new comers  w ould not have moved to their present high - ris k 
location , or w ould not have paid the s ame top dollar,  in the abs ence of  
s ubs idized premiums . Indeed, one of  the maj or c omplaints of  exis ting 
homeow ners  agains t the Biggert - Waters  A ct of  2012 (w hich, recall, 
dramatically s caled back the N F IP  s ubs idies ) w a s  their inability to af f ord 
the new  premiums and how  the new  premiums w e re s caring aw ay 
potential buyers  and making mortg age loans  unaf f ordable .10 7  
 
2.  Regulation of Pr ecautions  
Ins urance contracts  af f ect not only the s cope of activity, but als o 
the level of  care taken by policyholders. Auto ins urance, f or example, 
can induce people to drive more caref ully (through experience rating); 
environmental liability ins urance can induce f irms  to ins tall spill 
prevention meas ures ; and f ire ins urance can induce proprietors to inves t 
in  sprinklers. 10 8  How  does  government ins urance of  w eather ris k perform 
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as a ris k mitigation mechanis m?  H is torically, not very w ell.  As 
dis cus s ed above, the f lood  maps used by F EM A  to adminis ter the N F IP  
are notorious ly out of  date.  And even w hen they are up to date, the 
premiums are  heavily s ubs idized f or many properties in the highes t ris k 
areas , giving little incentive to ins tall los s  reducing meas ures .   
This  s ituation s eemed to be changing af ter the enactment of  
Biggert - Waters  in 2012, as  rapid premium increas es  began to induce  
behavioral changes  on the part of property owners.  Under the new  maps 
that w ere to be us ed, the af f ordability of  ins urance depended u pon, 
among other things , how  high one’s  home w as  built above certain 
expected f lood levels.  H omeow ners  rebuilding in N ew  Y ork, N ew  
J ers ey, and Connecticut f ollow ing H urricane  S andy  w ere induced to 
inves t in s tilts , rais ing their homes  above the bas e f lood  elevation .10 9  
Whether this  trend w ill continue now  that Biggert - Waters  has  been cut 
back remains  to be s een.  
Compared to f lood mitigation, t he role of  government ins urance 
in encouraging w ind mitigation is  perhaps more encouraging , although it 
is  dif f icult to know  f or certain .  In Florida, f or example, Citizens  
provides dis counts  to any of  its  policyholders  w ho can demons trate that 
the property they are ins uring meets  a lis t of  highly detailed des ign 
specifications. 11 0  Indeed, in F lorida all ins urers — private a nd public — are 
required by s tatute to provide s uch dis counts. 11 1   Becaus e w ind 
mitigation dis counts  in F lorida are a matter of  s tatutory mandate, it is 
impossible to determine w hat s orts  of  w ind mitigation dis counts  a private 
ins urer , abs ence s uch a mandate,  w ould be w illing to provide .  A similar 
picture can be s een in  other coas tal s tates. 11 2   For this  reas on, it is  
dif f icult to document a “ care level” advantage on the part of private 
ins urers  w ith respect to coas tal w ind mitigation.   
It is  eas y to s ee, how ever, the cons iderable “ activity level” 
advantage that private ins urance has  over government ins urance of  
coas tal w eather ris k.  If private ins urers  w ere permitted to charge w hat 
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the market w ould bear f or coas tal w eather ris k (and w er e not limited by 
s tate ins urance regulators ), the prices would be cons iderably higher than 
they currently are , especially f or the ris kies t communities  living clos e to 
w a t e r .  This claim is  s upported by anecdotal evidence. 11 3   It is  s upported 
by the s hort exp erience of  rate hikes  under the Biggert - Waters  A ct, 
w hich  “ s cared the bej es us  out of  people.”  1 1 4   A nd it is  s upported by 
Citizens  data, w here the s ubs idies  f or coas tal w ind ins urance ref lect the 
dif f erence betw een w hat Citizens  actually charges  f or s uch ris ks  and 
w hat an actuarially accurate ins urance premium w ould be.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION :  THE END OF G OVERNMENT W EATHER INSURANCE ?  
 
G overnment ins urance f or w eather ris k is  s ubs idized. Either 
through dis as ter relief  or through individually purchased ins urance 
poli cies, people living in the zone of  dis as ter pay only a f raction of  the 
expected cos t. It is a s ubs idy program w ith great political s upport, resting 
on a popular belief  that it is  both f air and ef f icient. This article s how ed 
that both perceptions are w rong.  In delivering a s ubs idy that private 
ins urance does  not give, government ins urance inf licts  tw o dis tortions : 
regres s ive redis tribution and inef f icient inves tment in res idential 
property. These dis tortions  are not inherent to the f unction of  ins urance. 
They can be attenuated, and perhaps solved, by a return to private 
ins urance markets.  
In the cours e of  developi ng this  argument — the comparative 
performance of  government vers us  private ins urance — one cannot 
overlook the primary rationale f or government takeover of  w eather ris k 
ins urance: market penetration. The argument is  s traightf orw ard: w hen 
ins urance is  provided  through a relief  f und or w ith s ignif icant s ubs id ies , 
coverage can extend beyond w hat private  ins urance markets  provide, and 
res olve the markets  f ailures  of  private ins urance . Weather ris k, it is  
alleged, is  one s uch circums tance.   In thes e concluding rema rks , w e 
examine the concern f or market f ailures  in the provision of  private 
ins urance.  
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O ne possible concern w ith private ins urance f or w eather ris k is  
underins urance. Due to cognitive f ailures , homeow ners  buy too little 
coverage. 11 5  For example, it is  es tima ted that only 20% of  homeow ners  
in high f lood ris k areas  in N ew  Y ork City w ho are not required to 
purchase ins urance actually purchase coverage, even at s ubs idized rates.  
1 1 6  How ever, s evere w eather is  an odd area f or s uch an argument to be 
made. Surely peop le notice reports about w eather dis as ters. If anything, 
they tend to be overly s alient relative to other ins ured ris ks  (thus  
triggering a s alience bias ). Indeed, it is  es timated that f or every person 
who dies  in a s torm, 140 people must die f rom f amine to receive the 
s ame expected media coverage. 11 7  
What is  les s  s urprising, perhaps, is the f ailure of  homeow ners  to 
recognize that s tandard homeow ners  ins urance policies exclude f lood -
caus ed damage. Since much of  the des truction due to s evere w eather is  
f lood - related, it is  excluded and of f ered as  a s eparate contractual add - on. 
Notwiths tanding mandated dis clos ures  that alert people and remind them 
to purchase s epa rate f lood ins urance, it is  ques tionable w hether s uch 
w arnings  appended to complex preprinted ins urance policies could 
s ucces s f ully inf orm people .11 8  The res ulting gap in coverage is  a market 
f ailure that government ins urance can s tep in to correct. And yet,  a more 
modes t intervention can res olve this  problem. Instead of  being the 
provider of  ins urance,  the government can s imply mandate f lood 
ins urance  in areas  w here s ome cos ts  are otherw is e s hif ted to the public  
(as  it does  f or homes  w ith f ederally guarantee d mortgage loans ). The 
mandate w ould us her people to ins urance markets , w ithout the need f or 
government s ubs idy of  policies.  
Another concern w ith private ins urance f or w eather ris k is  the 
capacity to ins ure mega - dis as ters. W eather - related ris ks  are commonl y 
regarded as  only partially ins urable  becaus e of  the problem of  ris k 
correlation. It is conventional w is dom that private ins urance markets  w ill 
f ail to perform their ris k - spreading f unction w hen the ins ured ris ks  are 
correlated w ith each other — w hen too ma ny of  the members  of  the 
ins urance pool face the s ame ris k and incur their los s  in the s ame 
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circums tances. 11 9  That a number of  ins urers  became ins olvent in the 
af termath of  maj or hurricanes  reinf orces  the notion that the mos t extreme 
cas es  of  s evere w eather are j us t too big f or private ins urance to handle 
alone.  
But is  that in f act true?  Is  extreme w eather ris k actually 
unins urable through private markets ?  A t leas t s ince the 1990s , af ter the 
N orthridge Earthquake and H urricane A ndrew  dis as ters  exposed the 
inadequacy of  capital that w as  then being deployed in cat as trophe 
reins urance markets , concerns  have been expressed about the “ capacity” 
of  private markets  to handle the once - in - a - generation dis as ter .12 0   In  
theory, it is  not clear w hy even the larges t s torms  s hould not be 
ins urable, given the amount of  capital av ailable in the w orld to provide a 
hedge agains t s uch ris ks.  Even large correlated r is ks  on the local or 
national level are  uncorrelated and manageable, in terms  of  ris k 
spreading ,  on a global level.  This is  w hat reins urance markets  do: they 
take the ris k s  ins ured by individual ins urance companies around the 
w orld, pool them together, and then dis tribute them acros s  inves tors  
w orldw ide.  So why are  s o f ew  as s ets  allocated to catas trophe 
reins urance markets ?  
A  range of  explanations  have been of f ered f or the  apparent 
shortage of  reins urance capital , including tax incentives , agency cos ts , 
and exploitation of  market power . 12 1   At the s ame time,  ins urance 
market s  ha ve  responded with a w ave of  f inancial innovation des igned to 
increas e the market’s  s upply of catas t rophic reins urance capacity.  1 2 2   
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O ne of  the mos t promising developments in building capital res erves  f or  
mega - catas trophes has  occurred in s ecurities  markets — the development 
of  the catas trophic bond (“ cat bond”).   
Cat bonds  are tradable debt s ecurities  iss ued by ins urers. They 
are s old to inves tors  in capital markets  and promise a generous  interes t 
rate .  What dis tinguis hes  thes e bonds  f rom regular debt ins truments  is  
that the payment of  interes t and the repayment of  principal are 
contingent upon the non - oc currence of  s ome catas trophe - related 
trigger. 12 3  Thus , if  a mega - s torm occurs  that triggers  the cat bond, the 
ins urer  w ho is s ued the bonds  is  relieved f rom the obligation to redeem 
the bond. The ins urer is  in ef f ect able  to us e the principal to  cover s torm -
r elated los s es.  Thus, a s  the us e of  cat bonds  has  been expanding  rapidly 
over the past two decades , the capacity  f or the private ins urability of  
extreme w eather ris ks  continues  to expand as w ell. 12 4  I n the abs ence of  
publicly provided catas trophe insurance  t his  expansion w ould have likely 
been greater.  
If ins uring capacity is  not an ins urmountable  problem f or  private 
ins urance  of  w eather ris k , af f ordability may w ell be.  In areas  s ubj ect to 
s evere w eather, private ins urance is  of f ered, but  priced at f ull ris k  it is 
expensive , and f or many unaf f ordable . True, w ithout ins urance thes e 
homeow ners  w ould als o be unable to rebuild their property if  los t, and 
ins uring it might be a rational cos t - minimizing choice. But it is  s till a 
luxury that many cannot af f ord  (and, as  explained above, w ere not 
f actoring in  w hen moving to the area) . Imagine, then, communities  in 
w hich many res idents  are unins ured agains t w eather devas tation. What 
w ould happen in thes e communities  af ter a dis as trous  s torm ?  
Collectively - provided dis as ter relief  is  the common response. We 
des cribed in P art II the f ederal s tatutory f ramew ork f or dis as ter relief. 
But this  organized relief  f ramew ork merely pr ovides s tructure and 
unif ormity, and perhaps bolsters ,  w hat w ould otherw is e be a spontaneous  
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a ction on part of s ociety. Major dis as ters  have a w ay of  arous ing a s trong 
urge to s upport the victims. Such catas trophes generate an extraordinary 
amount of  media attention and trigger a demand by the public to lend a 
collective hand — paid for by taxpayers — to the unlucky f ew , culminating 
in special legis lative action to appropriate f unds. The September 11 t h  
attacks , f or example, were unprecedented not only in their magnitude, 
but als o in the w ay they def ied a s ens e of  normality and the expectations  
of  public  saf ety.  It is  theref ore unders tandable that s uch an event 
res ulted in the enactment of  the mos t generous  victim compensation f und 
in A merican his tory. 12 5   
The emergence of  s uch ad - hoc f unds  f or relief  f rom dis as ters  not 
covered by exis ting s tatutes  is  a te s tament to the collective’s  conviction 
that s hif ting the los s  f rom the direct victims  is  a w ay to mitigate the 
overall devas tating impact of a dis as ter. For one, the los s  is  thus  borne by 
a broader pool of payers, unable to drain the high marginal utility regions  
of  people’s welf are  f unctions . Moreover, w ith the geographical 
concentration of  victims , dis as ters  have a “ s uper - additive” impact, 
des troying not only the s um of  the individual properties or lives , but 
entire communities.  Thus, unlike more routine  los s  events  (s uch as  thos e 
that f all below  the dis as ter declaration thres hold), relief  paid out f or truly 
catas trophic disas ters  is  not regarded as  a bailout of  the irresponsibly 
unins ured. 12 6     
When the magnitude of  des truction caus ed by w eather dis as ters  is 
exceptionally high relative to past traj ectories — w hen they reach more 
victims  at greater s cale and caus e deeper misery than prior patterns 
predict — ad hoc relief  is  s et in motion. Hurricanes  K atrina and S andy are 
examples of s uch events , exceptional in the magnitude and s cope of 
harm and des truction they inf licted on entire communities. 12 7  The 
corresponding f ederal dis as ter relief  f or the 2005 hurricane s eas on and 
f or H urricane S andy  totaled $109 billion and $ 66 billion, respectively .12 8  
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If  dis as ter relief  is  an irres is tible ins tinct of  a decent s ociety, it is  
a s ocial ins urance s cheme that people — especially if  unins ured through 
ordinary means — can rely on. It matters  not that many of  the victims  
could have purchased ins urance  (does  the Coas t G uard ref rain f r om 
res cuing a drow ning ves s el that f ailed to equip itself  w ith adequate lif e 
boats ?)  This  s ocial ins urance can be eliminated if  people buy ins urance 
policies. Hence, the government’s  s ubs idy of  s uch policies can be 
unders tood as  an attempt to shif t f rom f unding completely f ree ex post 
relief  to f unding a cos t - s haring s cheme.  
We can end this  article w ith a call f or ending government - run 
w eather ins urance, replacing it w ith pinpointed need - bas ed s ubs idies. 
This w ould eliminate the inef f icient incentives  to develop and redevelop 
coastal land, as  w ell as  the regres s ive redis tribution. But where  is the 
s ens e in s uch naïve proposal? Congres s  did enact a law  to eliminate the 
f lood ins urance s ubs idies — a bipartisan law  remarkably passed in the 
peak days  of  partisan  gridlock — only to quickly tos s  it out in an even 
more w idely s upported bill. Insurance af f ordability, it turns  out, is  one of  
the mos t ef f ective political calls  to arms , res ulting here in a premium 
s cheme that w ill likely remain in place for decades. We ca n only 
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Figure 1  
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Figure 2  
S o u r c e :  P e t e r  H o eppe, W h y  a r e  C ities  P a rticu l a r l y  A f f e cted  b y  C l i m ate C h a n g e ? ,  
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Table 1: Regressions using Log Absolute Subsidy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Coverage w/ Policy FE w/ Territory SE Cluster w/ Policy FE (Terr Cluster) Log HH Value (ZIP Cluster) w/ Policy FE (ZIP Cluster)
log coverage 1.052!!! 1.052!!! 1.052!!! 1.052!!!
(252.20) (252.22) (13.64) (13.64)
Iptype 1 0.108! 0.108! -0.0118
(2.56) (2.56) (-0.05)
log hh 0.484!!! 0.484!!!
(4.05) (4.05)
cons -7.645!!! -7.647!!! -7.645!!! -7.647!!! -0.675 -0.675
(-150.40) (-150.42) (-8.13) (-8.14) (-0.47) (-0.47)
N 339046 339046 339046 339046 339038 339038
t statistics in parentheses
! p < 0.05, !! p < 0.01, !!! p < 0.001
1
Table 1: Regression with % Subsidies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)


































(-101.61) (-96.30) (-6.45) (-6.26) (-2.93) (-2.51)
N 527250 527250 527250 527250 527236 527236
t statistics in parentheses
! p < 0.05, !! p < 0.01, !!! p < 0.001
1
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